




Introduction


- 1. What we have learnt in terms of rating policy
- 2. What we know
- 3. What we think we know
- 4. What we do not know





















Economic integration enhance resiliency

- Reduces the probability of crisis
- Reduces the severity of crisis creating counter-cyclical features
- Examples: the EU anchor, Asia's rebound after the crisis



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3. What do we think we know

- Not all current account imbalances are alike
- Liquidity risk and solvency risk
- Local currency debt is generally less risky than foreign currency debt
- Banking integration provides more stability than financial market integration, but financial market development remains key



Not all current account imbalances are alike

- A simple analytical approach:
 - The nature/stability of financing is key
 - How vulnerable is the CA deficit? How robust is the financing and how susceptible to an external shock?
 - How sustainable is it? The determinants of the deficit (the S-I gap), the "Lawson doctrine" and the question of competitiveness
 - How severe should an hypothetical crisis be from the point of view of the government's balance sheet?
- Examples: Central and Eastern Europe
- Is that right after all?

Moody's Investors Service

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Liquidity risk and solvency risk

- Liquidity crisis: price and volume effects
- Mature market economies are not vulnerable to financing discontinuities, but "simply" to price adjustments
- Implications: net debt versus gross debt
- How robust is this observation?



Local versus foreign currency debt

- The many benefits of raising funds in one's currency
- But in a context of open capital accounts, the superiority of LC debt should not be exaggerated
- **Example: Latin America**



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Banking integration versus financial integration (1)

- The value of international banking integration in terms of systemic strength
- Example: EU-wide banking integration
- However, this remains largely untested



| king integration | Versus | financ | ial inte | gratio |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| kiing iintegration | 10.545 | | | giatio |
| | | | | |
| Share of bank assets he | eld by foreigr | n banks¹ | | |
| | 1990 | 2004 ² | in per cent of GDP | in billions of USD |
| Central and eastern Europe | | | | |
| Bulgaria | 0 | 80 | 49 | 13 |
| Czech Republic | 10 | 96 | 92 | 99 |
| Estonia | | 97 | 89 | 11 |
| Hungary | 10 | 83 | 67 | 68 |
| Poland | 3 | 68 | 43 | 105 |
| Emerging Asia | | | | |
| China | 0 | 2 | 4 | 71 |
| Hong Kong | 89 | 72 | 344 | 570 |
| India | 5 | 8 | 6 | 36 |
| Korea | 4 | 8 | 10 | 65 |
| Malaysia | | 18 | 27 | 32 |
| Singapore | 89 | 76 | 148 | 159 |
| Thailand | 5 | 18 | 20 | 32 |
| Latin America | | | | |
| Argentina | 10 | 48 | 20 | 31 |
| Brazil | 6 | 27 | 18 | 107 |
| Chile | 19 | 42 | 37 | 35 |
| Mexico | 2 | 82 | 51 | 342 |
| Peru | 4 | 46 | 14 | 11 |
| Venezuela | 1 | 34 | 9 | 9 |
| Percentage share of total bank asse | ts. ² Or latest ava | ilable vear. | | |
| Sources: CGFS (2004); ECB; national | | | | Table 1 |
| | | | | |



4. What we still do not know Disentangling cyclical and structural factors Understanding crises dynamics and the micro-macro nexus The understanding of political risk remains elusive

