

“Macro Risk Premium and Intermediary Balance Sheet Quantities”

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Overview

- Summarize theoretical work that emphasizes linkages between financial intermediary balance sheets and real economic activity.
- Impose temporal structure to measure the “macro risk premium” and the “risk appetite” of the financial sector.
- Key finding: risk appetite granger causes macro-risk premium and hence economic activity.

Balance sheets and real activity:

- Broad credit channel:
 - Borrower balance sheets determine credit spreads and hence real spending decisions.
 - Financial accelerator mechanism – shocks to the economy are amplified via their effect on borrower net worth.
- Narrow credit channel:
 - Bank balance sheets determine ability of banks to raise external funds.
 - As interest rates rise, bank assets become impaired, forcing a reduction in lending to bank-dependent borrowers.

The shadow-banking channel:


- Shocks to value of assets held by financial institutions influence leverage of the financial sector.
 - As risk appetites of financial institutions decline, premiums on corporate and household debt rise.
- Why is this important?
 - Leverage of shadow banking system is much greater than leverage in non-financial sector.
 - Leverage of shadow banks is more procyclical than commercial banks owing to systematic use of mark-to-market accounting (value at risk) in risk management.

Empirical approach:

- Macro risk premium summarizes contemporaneous relationship between credit spreads and current economic activity.
 - Reverse causation: current and future cash flows fall, leading to a rise in credit spreads owing to increased default risk.
- Risk appetite summarizes relationship between current risk premium and lagged balance sheets.
 - Mark to market accounting procedures also raise issues of reverse causation when measuring risk appetite.
- Temporal assumptions are somewhat arbitrary:
 - Time-to-build mechanisms imply that a rise in corporate credit spreads today influences investment spending tomorrow.

Alternative approach:

- Gilchrist and Zakrajsek estimate the “Excess Bond Premium” by decomposing credit spreads into a default risk component and a residual component that measures the risk appetite of corporate bond investors.
- Financial institutions (commercial banks, investment banks, insurance companies) are the primary purchasers of corporate bonds.
- If markets are segmented, risk appetite of financial institutions drives the EPB.




GDP Growth Forecast:								
	<i>1 Quarter Horizon</i>				<i>4 Quarter Horizon</i>			
<i>r</i>	-4.69 (-5.96)	-	-	-1.81 (-2.14)	-2.29 (-2.94)	-	-	-1.79 (-0.31)
<i>l</i>	-	7.89 (5.90)	-	3.92 (2.95)	-	6.04 (5.60)	-	4.18 (4.85)
<i>ebp</i>	-	-	-2.62 (-7.23)	-1.76 (-4.19)	-	-	-2.19 (-7.71)	-2.10 (-7.70)
<i>R</i> ²	0.28	0.28	0.36	0.48	0.08	0.26	0.40	0.58


Excess Stock Return Forecast:								
	<i>1 Quarter Horizon</i>				<i>4 Quarter Horizon</i>			
<i>r</i>	-13.75	-	-	18.27	1.75	-	-	19.19
	(-0.94)	-	-	(1.14)	(0.20)	-	-	(2.60)
<i>l</i>	-	49.37	-	26.16	-	8.32	-	-5.51
	-	(2.06)	-	(1.03)	-	(0.62)	-	(0.51)
<i>ebp</i>	-	-	-24.53	-25.38	-	-	-23.78	-27.27
	-	-	(-3.74)	(-3.35)	-	-	(-6.98)	(-7.69)
<i>R</i> ²	0.00	0.036	0.13	0.13	0.00	0.00	0.36	0.40

Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.


Response of DLGDP to L




Response of VWXRETD to L



Response of L to L




Response of EBP to L




Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.


Response of DLGDP to EBP




Response of VWXRETD to EBP



Response of L to EBP



Response of EBP to EBP



Summary:

- Very intuitive approach to studying the relationship between financial intermediary balance sheets and economic activity
- Risk appetite forecasts future GDP growth and shocks to risk appetite have impact on GDP in a VAR framework.
- Shocks to excess bond premium appear to drive risk appetite, (as well as GDP and stock market).
- Ultimately we need to impose more discipline on data to fully identify causal mechanisms linking financial intermediary balance sheets and real activity.