Cover (11
kb PDF file) |
Main
Report (356 kb PDF file) |
Appendix (106
kb PDF file) |
Summary of Findings and Recommendations |
|
A. |
Framework |
|
B. |
Findings: Quantitative Aspects of Fiscal Adjustment |
|
C. |
Social Spending and Social Protection in IMF-Supported Programs |
|
D. |
Reforms in the Fiscal Area Under IMF-Supported Programs |
|
E. |
Recommendations |
I. |
Introduction
|
II. |
Fiscal Targeting in IMF-Supported Programs: Cross-Country Analysis |
|
A. |
Relevant Considerations in Determining the Fiscal Stance |
|
B. |
Factors Determining the Scale and Nature of Fiscal Adjustment |
III. |
Fiscal Adjustment as Presented in Program Documents and the Internal Review Process |
|
A. |
Fiscal Adjustment in Program Request Documents |
|
B. |
The Internal Review Process Prior to Board Approval and During Program Implementation |
IV. |
Fiscal Performance Compared with Targets |
|
A. |
Cross-Country Analysis |
|
B. |
Flexibility of Fiscal Targets During Program Reviews |
|
C. |
What Accounts for Large Fiscal Underperformance? Evidence from the Smaller Sample |
V. |
Economic Recovery and Growth |
|
A. |
Economic Recovery in the Program Period: Outcomes and Expectations |
|
B. |
Optimism in Projecting Private Demand and Investment |
|
C. |
Is the Fiscal Stance in IMF-Supported Programs Unnecessarily Contractionary? |
VI. |
Social Spending and Social Protection in IMF-Supported Programs |
|
A. |
Has Donor Aid Been Underestimated? |
|
B. |
Social Spending Under IMF-Supported Programs: Cross-Country Evidence |
|
C. |
The Role of the IMF in Connection with Social Expenditure and Social Protection |
VII. |
Fiscal Reforms in IMF-Supported Programs |
|
A. |
Fiscal Reforms in Programs: An Overview |
|
B. |
Progress in Implementing Reforms |
|
C. |
Learning from the Past and the Role of Surveillance in Monitoring Progress |
Tables |
1. |
Initial Conditions as Seen by Staff at the Start of the Program |
2. |
Program Projections: Changes in Balances from (T-1) to (T+1) |
3. |
The Direction of Change in Selected Macroeconomic Targets in IMF-Supported Programs as a Share of GDP |
4. |
The Pace of the Envisaged Fiscal Adjustment |
5. |
Degree to which Program Documents Explain the Rationale, Magnitude, and Composition of the Envisaged Fiscal Adjustment |
6. |
Average Public Debt Prior to and Following the Initial Program Year |
7. |
Selected Topics Commented on During the Review of 15 IMF-Supported Programs |
8. |
Changes in External and Fiscal Balances from (T-1) to (T+1) |
9. |
Differences Between Actual and Projected Changes in Fiscal Balances |
10. |
The Dynamics of Fiscal Adjustment |
11. |
Percentage Distribution of Programs with Fiscal Shortfalls |
12. |
The Composition of Fiscal Adjustment in Programs with Fiscal Underperformance |
13. |
Changes in Government Balances, Revenue, and Expenditures in Large Episodes of Envisaged Adjustment from
(T-1) to (T+1) |
14. |
Distribution of Programs According to Revisions in Growth and Fiscal Balances |
15. |
Revisions in Fiscal Balance Targets for T+1 |
16. |
Summary of Reasons for the Revised Fiscal Balance Target |
17. |
Envisaged and Actual Fiscal Adjustment in Nine IMF-Supported Programs |
18. |
Comparing Growth and Revenue Underperformance |
19. |
Revenue-Related Structural Reform Measures in Selected Programs with Large Revenue Shortfalls |
20. |
Experience with GDP Growth Prior To and During Program Periods |
21. |
Programs Showing Deceleration/Negative Growth |
22. |
Envisaged and Actual Two-Year Cumulative Growth Rates over T and T+1 |
23. |
Indicators of Growth Optimism for T+1 |
24. |
Investment Projections and Actuals Under IMF-Supported Programs, 1993-2001 |
25. |
Macroeconomic Balances in SBA and EFF Programs in Nontransition Countries |
26. |
Public Sector Social Spending Indicators |
27. |
Number of Countries With and Without Statistically Significant Results |
28. |
Effectiveness in Identifying and Monitoring Social Spending in the Program Requests of 15 Selected Arrangements |
29. |
The Ecuador Program: Imbalance Between Efficiency and Equity Measures Underpinned by Conditionality |
30. |
Distribution of Areas of Fiscal Reforms and Those Supported by Conditionality |
Figures |
1. |
Distribution of Programs According to the Magnitude of the Envisaged Change in the Overall Fiscal Balance (T-1 to T+1)
|
2. |
Distribution of Programs According to Differences in Fiscal Adjustment Between Original Targets and Reviews |
3. |
Distribution of Programs According to Differences Between Actual and Envisaged Cumulative Growth Over a
Two-Year Period (T and T+1) |
4. |
SBA and EFF Programs According to Differences Between Actual and Projected Investment Rates for T+1 |
5. |
Estimated Impact of a Two-Year IMF-Supported Program |
6. |
Index Indicating Implementation Progress in 153 Fiscal Reform Measures in 15 IMF-Supported Programs |
7. |
Progress Implementing Fiscal Reforms in 15 IMF-Supported Program |
8. |
Index of Performance: Learning, Follow-Up, and Links Between Programs and Surveillance |
9. |
Distribution of Cases According to Performance |
Boxes |
1. |
How Well Do Documents Explain the Rationale for Fiscal Adjustment?
|
2. |
The 1997 Guidelines on Social Expenditure |
3. |
How Public Hospitals in Ecuador Adjusted in a Time of Crisis |
4. |
Protecting Critical Programs is Not Costly When Programs are Well Targeted |
5. |
Public Finance Reform Areas |
6. |
Ecuador: What a Determined Head of Tax Administration Can Do |
7. |
The Romania Program: Diminishing Returns to Raising Tax Rates |
8. |
Tax Reform in the 1996 Tanzania ESAF |
9. |
Good Examples of Learning from the Past |
Appendices
|
I. |
Table 1. Determinants of the Envisaged and Actual Fiscal Adjustment (T-1 to T+1) in IMF-Supported Programs |
I. |
Table 2. Determinants of the Differences Between Envisaged and Actual Fiscal Adjustment |
II. |
Code Book for Assessing the Need for Fiscal Adjustment |
III. |
Table 1. Levels of Grants in a Sample of Sub-Saharan African Countries |
III. |
Table 2. Changes in Levels of Grants |
III. |
Table 3. Aid Flows Under IMF Programs, 1995-2001 |
IV. |
Explanatory Variables and Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Social Spending in IMF-Supported Programs |
IV. |
Table 2. ARIMA Model with Control Variables and Endogenous Fund Programs |
IV. |
Table 3. Summary of Robustness Analysis |
IV. |
Table 4. Summary of Regression Results |
IV. |
Table 5. Control Variables for Social Spending |
IV. |
Table 6. List of Countries and Sub-Samples |
V. |
Table 1. Coverage of Social Issues in IMF-Supported Programs |
VI. |
Table 1. Progress with Reforms in 15 Selected IMF-Supported Programs |
VII. |
Illustrative Selection of TA Inputs to Fiscal Reforms in the Lead Up to the IMF-Supported Programs in 15 Countries |
VIII. |
Table 1. Effectiveness of Surveillance |
VIII. |
Table 2. Article IV Reports Reviewed in the Pre-Program Period |
Bibliography (57 kb pdf file) |
Statement by the Managing Director |
Staff Response |
IEO Comments on Staff Response |
Summing Up of the IMF Executive Board Discussion
by Acting Chair (23kb pdf file) |