THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL TURMOIL: Origins and Policy Response

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* These are the opinions of the author alone and should not be taken to represent the views of the IMF, its executive board, or its management.


OVERVIEW

- WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
- GLOBAL FINANCIAL TURMOIL
 - Origins
 - Policy responses
 - Some basic principles of crisis resolution
 - Comparison with Asian crisis (1997-98)
 - Role of IMF.
- CHINA'S ECONOMIC SITUATION: developments, outlook, risks.

WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

- Picture worsened over past month.
- Major economies going into recession.
- Emerging economies also slowing.

World economy slowing sharply




Source: IMF staff estimates.

Particularly advanced countries

	GDP growth				
	(WEO Update - November)				
_		2008	2009		
	World	3.7	2.2		
	Advanced economies	1.4	-0.3		
	United States	1.4	-0.7		
	Euro area	1.2	-0.5		
	Japan	0.5	-0.2		
	Emerging and developing economies	6.6	5.1		
	China	9.7	8.5		

Confidence weak

Figure 4. Business Confidence Indicators



Sources: Haver Analytics; and IMF staff estimates.


GLOBAL FINANCIAL TURMOIL

Outline of crisis:

- monetary policy and easy regulation spurred risk taking and leverage,
- supervision/regulation failed to keep pace with financial innovation.
- Responses: focus on financial sector (liquidity; recapitalization; distressed assets) and on economic stimulus.

Problems emerged first in sub-prime mortgages...


(60+ day delinquencies, in percent of original balance)




...but soon in many other markets, including during 2007-2008:


- Derivatives (CDS, CDO, etc.)
- Corporate finance
- Monolines (bond insurers)
- Auction rate securities
- Even the interbank money market.

Market panic, leading to sharp price declines, risk aversion, volatility....






...and shortage of liquidity.



Real-financial sector linkages—vicious spiral



U.S. financial sector potential writedowns (Oct 2008; U.S. \$ bns.); GFSR Oct 2008

	Outstanding	Estimated losses
Total loans	12,370	425
Of which, subprime	300	50
Total securities	10,840	980
Total	23,210	1,405

U.S. update: policy response

- Problems: drying up of liquidity, eroded capital base, bad assets.
- Bailout: was necessary.
 - Alternatives (ad hoc, case by case) were not working; is a systemic response.
 - Initially focused on distressed assets. But now appropriately has turned to solvency concerns (recapitalization).
- Stimulus: measures.
- Risks: regional banks, real-financial feedback loops, size of solvency problems.

Europe update

- Initially different approaches: Ireland,
 Germany, UK on deposit guarantees
- Needed systemic, pro-active approach
- UK showed the way
- Joint commitments for: timely recapitalization, cross-border institutions/regulations, etc.
- Stimulus

Asia: many countries taking measures to maintain confidence in banking system...

- Liquidity injections: new facilities; expanding range of collateral and access to central bank discount windows.
- Extended guarantees to bank deposits (Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia) and bank debt (Australia, Korea).
- Plans for bank recapitalization contingency funds (Japan, India, Hong Kong SAR).

...and macroeconomic responses

- With inflation easing, cuts in policy rates (e.g., Australia, China, India, Korea, New Zealand, Vietnam).
- **Fiscal stimulus** measures (e.g., Australia, China, Japan, Korea, and New Zealand).

Some principles of crisis resolution

- Restoring confidence 1st priority
- Requires comprehensive plan (not piecemeal/ad-hoc)
- Liquidity problems often turn out to be solvency problems
- Re-capitalization is key
- Use of public money has to come with safeguards for taxpayers

How is current crisis similar/different from the Asian crisis (1997-1998)?

- Financial crisis (U.S.) versus financial-plus-f.x. crisis (Asia): different implications for monetary policy
- Fiscal policy easing: similar response
- Financial sector: similar responses: early loss recognition; liquidity support; support depositors; close non-viable institutions; AMCs; bank supervision
- Trade/capital liberalization: situations different; also, advice more focused.

Role of IMF in current situation

- Moving quickly to help affected emerging countries. Stands ready to lend over \$200 billion. Offering policy advice.
- New short-term lending facility: help countries with sound fundamentals who face acute liquidity pressures.
- Questions of resources and new roles in global financial architecture. (November 15 summit.)


CHINA

China's economic conditions and outlook


CHINA: Outlook


- Growth slowing but still 8-9% (2009).
 China's growth helpful for world economy.
- Direct exposure to troubled foreign institutions limited.
- Low inflation provides scope for policy easing if needed (Nov. 9 stimulus).
- Risks: overcapacity from high investment (NPLs); fall in foreign demand (e.g., ↓ in global conditions/↑ in protectionism).

GDP slowing




FAI growth driven down by weakening real estate sector






Source: CEIC, IMF Staff Calculation

Slower loan growth (credit constraints)...




...and decline in stock market since Oct. 2007



But retail sales robust







And trade balance still large.




Reserves continue to rise



Exchange rate strengthening



Fiscal situation healthy



Measures to support growth

- Nov. 9 stimulus package (headline figure RMB 4 trillion, 14% of 2008 GDP).
- Monetary policy loosening: interest rates, reserve requirements, lifting of credit quotas
- Tax rebates.
- Support to the property market.
- Ongoing reforms in social services, rural areas, infrastructure.

China outlook

	2007	2008	2009
Growth rates			
Real GDP (production based)	11.9	9.7	8.5
Consumption	11	11-	11+
Gross investment	14	11	10
Net exports (contribution)	3.6	1.2	0.0
Export growth	19	11	8
Import growth	13	11	11
CPI inflation (average)	4.8	6.2	3.4
Percent of GDP			
Current account balance	11.3	9.4	9.6
Trade balance (g/s)/GDP	9.6	7.9	8.2

WEO staff projections

Risks

- Domestic: Overcapacity → activity↓,
 NPLs ↑. (Years of high investment; non-real-estate investment still robust.)
- External: protectionism; sharper/longer than expected global slowdown

Summary

- World economic outlook in near-term is weak.
 Strong growth in China is helpful.
- Countries moving to repair financial sectors and provide stimulus. IMF helping with financial and policy support.
- China little affected by financial damage, but will experience some slowdown. Recent measures are helpful, but there are also risks.