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Shifting Perceptions: Unpacking Public Support for Immigrant Workers Integration in the Labor Market

Silvia Albrizio, Hippolyte Balima, Bertrand Gruss, Eric Huang and Colombe Ladreit

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ABSTRACT: This paper investigates public perceptions and support for policies aimed at integrating immigrant workers into domestic labor markets. Through large-scale surveys involving 6,300 respondents from Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom, we provide new insights into attitudes toward migrant integration policies and the impact of different information provisions on belief updating. We identify three key factors that shape policy support: pre-existing stereotypes about immigrants, awareness of labor market integration policies for migrants, and, most critically, the perceived economic and social impact of these policies. Our findings reveal that providing information about the economic effects of integrating immigrants in the labor market significantly alters perceptions and increases support for these policies. Notably, explanations of the economic mechanisms underlying these policies are more effective than simply presenting policy effects or real-life stories of integration challenges. The survey also identifies the primary barriers to policy support, with fairness considerations toward unemployed native workers emerging as the top concern. It reveals that addressing individuals' specific concerns through tailored mitigation measures can enhance support for policies aimed at better integration migrants. Nevertheless, a significant challenge remains in overcoming mistrust in the government's commitment and ability to effectively implement these policies and accompanying measures.

Shifting Perceptions: Unpacking Public Support for Immigrant Workers Integration in the Labor Market

Prepared by Silvia Albrizio, Hippolyte Balima, Bertrand Gruss, Eric Huang and Colombe Ladreit[1]

Shifting Perceptions: Unpacking Public Support for Immigrant Workers Integration in the Labor Market. *

Silvia Albrizio[†]   Hippolyte Balima[‡]   Bertrand Gruss[§]   Eric Huang[¶]
Colombe Ladreit[‖]

Abstract

This paper investigates public perceptions and support for policies aimed at integrating immigrant workers into domestic labor markets. Through large-scale surveys involving 6,300 respondents from Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom, we provide new insights into attitudes toward migrant integration policies and the impact of different information provisions on belief updating. We identify three key factors that shape policy support: pre-existing stereotypes about immigrants, awareness of labor market integration policies for migrants, and, most critically, the perceived economic and social impact of these policies. Our findings reveal that providing information about the economic effects of integrating immigrants in the labor market significantly alters perceptions and increases support for these policies. Notably, explanations of the economic mechanisms underlying these policies are more effective than simply presenting policy effects or real-life stories of integration challenges. The survey also identifies the primary barriers to policy support, with fairness considerations toward unemployed native workers emerging as the top concern. It reveals that addressing individuals' specific concerns through tailored mitigation measures can enhance support for policies aimed at better integration migrants. Nevertheless, a significant challenge remains in overcoming mistrust in the government's commitment and ability to effectively implement these policies and accompanying measures.

Keywords: Labor market integration policies, Survey, Perceptions, Immigration, Online experiment, Political Economy

JEL classification: D91, D93, F22, J61, P00

[†]International Monetary Fund. Email: salbrizio@imf.org
[‡]International Monetary Fund. Email: hbalima@imf.org
[§]International Monetary Fund. Email: bgruss@imf.org
[¶]International Monetary Fund. Email: ehuang@imf.org
[‖]International Monetary Fund. Email: cladreit@imf.org

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1 Introduction

Foreign-born workers can bring a significant boost to growth, in particular in advanced economies where labor shortage due to aging constraints potential output. Previous studies have highlighted the positive impact of immigrants on output and productivity in the medium term (Aiyar et al. (2016), Mitaritonna et al. (2017), Bove and Elia (2017), Dustmann and Preston (2019), Tabellini (2020)), especially when adequate migrant-integration policies are in place (WEO (2020)). Faster recognition of foreign qualification, mentoring and active labor market policies, and work-focused language training are examples of measures that lead to faster and better labor market integration and skills matching, amplifying the positive economic effect on the hosting country (ILO (2018)). However, instead of witnessing a consistent trend of reforms aimed at improving labor market integration, an increasing number of countries are moving towards more restrictive requirements for foreign workers (OECD (2023)). Paraphrasing Clemens (2011), we would not expect authorities to overlook opportunities to integrate foreign-born unemployed workers potentially worth trillions of dollars, especially in countries with aging populations and given the current large refugee flows due to escalating conflicts. A major challenge for policy agendas promoting the integration of foreign-born workers into labor markets is social resistance (Alesina and Tabellini (2024)), which has become increasingly widespread as more countries witness protests against migrant integration policies (WEO (2024)) and stronger support for right-wing anti-immigration political parties (Barone et al. (2016), Colantone and Stanig (2019), Halla et al. (2017)).

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we seek to understand what drives public support for reforms aimed at integrating immigrants into the domestic labor market and test whether alternative information strategies can influence the level of support. Second, we identify reasons for oppositions among respondents not convinced by the information treatments and study whether targeted complementary measures can address their concerns and enhance support.

Previous literature on migration has focused on the determinants of attitudes towards migration and has uncovered that misperceptions and beliefs on the characteristics of the immigrant population (such as size, cultural distance, etc) play an important role, together with perceived economic costs and benefits of large immigration episodes (Haaland and Roth (2020)). Departing from these contributions, we do not discuss attitudes towards immigrants *per se* or preference in terms of the level of immigrants in the host country, but we con-

centrate on attitudes towards the labor market integration of immigrants already living in the hosting country.[1] Therefore, the first contribution of this study is to collect individuals' awareness of migrant integration policies and their perceived impact on the economy and society, with the ultimate goal of understanding respondents' support for these policies. For this purpose, we conducted a large cross-country survey in three countries, including Canada, Italy and United Kingdom. Each country panel included 2,100 residents born in the country. The survey approach allows us to assess a large set of relevant predictors of policy support since we collect individuals' socioeconomic information as well as beliefs about relevant dimensions, such as trust in the government and society, stereotyped views about immigrants and zero-sum views, among others.

The second contribution of the paper is to test whether correcting biased perceptions about the effect of these policies can improve public support for migrant integration reforms. Previous literature found four dimensions of concern driving negative attitudes towards immigrants: concerns about the labor market, welfare, security, and cultural differences (Alesina and Tabellini (2024), Dustmann and Preston (2007), Dennison and Dražanová (2018), Dražanová (2020), Haaland and Roth (2020)). Moreover, various approaches have proven effective in leading individuals to update their beliefs and become more supportive of immigration. Notable examples include providing research-based evidence on the impact of migration on native labor outcomes (Haaland and Roth (2020)), fact-checking the characteristics of the immigrant population (Grigorieff et al. (2020), Dylong and Uebelmesser (2024)), and appealing to emotions (see Dennison (2022) for a review). Leveraging these findings, other survey-based contributions studying other policies areas (e.g., Stantcheva (2021)) on tax policies; Douenne and Fabre (2022) and Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) on climate mitigation policies), as well as studies on information experiments (Haaland et al. (2023), Stantcheva (2023a)), our survey incorporates a randomized experiment component with three treatments. Four groups of respondents of the same size are randomly allocated to one treatment arm or a control group. The first treatment consists of an illustrated slide-show providing cross-country research-based evidence of the effect of migrant integration policies on the economic growth, public finances, labor market outcomes for natives, and immigrants' crime rates. The second treatment adds to the first one by explaining the mechanisms behind the effect presented. Finally, the third treatment builds on previous contributions

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[1]Grigorieff et al. (2020) study attitudes towards both immigration and existing immigrants but do not focus on policies. Alesina et al. (2023) touch marginally upon attitudes towards policies. However, since it is not their primary focus, the policies considered are limited and not exclusively related to better and faster immigrants' job market integration.

highlighting that negative attitudes towards migrants are often driven by concerns about cultural and work ethic differences (Dennison and Dražanová (2018); Alesina et al. (2023)) and the importance of an empathetic narrative when providing information (Dražanová (2020)). It evaluates whether appealing to empathy has a different impact than providing plain information on the benefits of integration policies. For this purpose, the treatment shows real-life examples of policy-related obstacles faced by immigrants when entering the labor market, their perseverance and their success.

The third and last contribution of the paper is to look into the role of complementary and compensatory measures and the ultimate reasons for opposition. The reallocation of resources triggered by the influx of migrants requires an adjustment period during which some people will bear short-term costs, or at least perceive that they will be negatively affected. The survey design allows respondents to express post-treatment concerns about the distributional consequences of the policy change and any other reason that prevent them from supporting migrant integration policies. By zooming in on non-supporters, the analysis is able to identify the main reasons for opposition and test whether complementing the policy change with adequate mitigating measures addressing non-supporters' concerns would change their views. Finally, the last part of the survey collects respondents' views on the ultimate reasons behind their opposition to migrant integration policies after the mitigation policies were proposed to them.

Importantly, throughout the survey, we do not constrain the questions to a particular type of immigration (e.g. refugees, economic immigrants, legal or illegal immigrants). Instead, we define immigrants as people who moved to the surveyed country from abroad, and we elicit what stereotypes of immigrants respondents have in mind through an open-ended question at the beginning of the survey. We then categorize these answers and use them as control variables in the analysis. This approach improves the generalization our results as well as enables us to test for heterogeneous effects conditioning on pre-existing stereotypes of immigrants.

Our key findings are summarized as follows. Overall, individuals' beliefs matter more than socioeconomic factors in shaping support for migrant integration policies. Among the set of beliefs analyzed, we identify three key factors that influence policy support: stereotypes about immigrants, awareness of migrant integration policies, and, most critically, the perceived impact of these policies on the economy and crime. Regarding stereotypes, respondents who associate immigrants with refugees, attribute positive personal traits to them, and believe that immigration has a positive effect on the economy and society are more

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likely to support migrant integration policies. Conversely, individuals who associate immigrants with negative traits or illegal entry, or believe that immigration has negative effects on host countries are significantly more likely to oppose these policies.

Our findings on the treatment effects reveal that providing information to respondents is most effective when the mechanisms through which migrant integration policies operate are explained, rather than merely emphasizing policy effects or highlighting real-life immigrants' integration challenges. Importantly, the treatment effect is particularly effective in changing beliefs and shifting support of individuals with biased perceptions about immigrants and their effect on the economy as well as politically right leaning respondents.

Additionally, the survey reveals that the primary barrier to policy support relates to concerns over fairness toward native workers. However, when integration policies are coupled with mitigation measures, support increases significantly. Ultimately, the acceptability of these policies depends on the government's ability and commitment to effectively implement both the policies and the accompanying mitigation strategies.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly sets into context the paper with respect to previous literature, while Section 3 describes the data collection and presents the questionnaire. The subsequent sections present our main results: Section 4 focuses on individuals characteristics and beliefs correlated with support for migrant integration polices; Section 5 presents the treatment effect; Section 6 zooms into heterogeneity; Section 7 analyzes the role of complementary and compensatory measures and uncovers the ultimate reasons for opposition. Section 8 provides some robustness checks, and Section 9 concludes. The Appendix A provides variables definitions, descriptive statistics, the questionnaire for United Kingdom as well as the links to the online survey for the three countries.

2 Related literature

The paper relates to and contributes to two strands of literature.

Attitudes towards immigrants. Alesina and Tabellini (2024) distinguish three categories of determinants of natives' attitudes towards immigration: labor market considerations, the "welfare burden" argument—for which taxes paid by immigrants may not cover the public spending required for services they consume, resulting in a net fiscal burden—and cultural concerns. The latter is regarded as non-economic concerns. Under this broader umbrella, not only perceived cultural differences but also security concerns play a relevant role (Dennison and Dražanová (2018)). Across these dimensions, immigrants are commonly

perceived to have a negative impact on their host country by reducing employment opportunities for natives, crowding out services, free riding on social welfare, increasing crime rates, or not adhering to certain cultural norms of the host country. Previous literature uses experimental approaches to test what helps improve support for immigration. Some experiments involve information on immigrants population size and characteristics. Alesina and Tabellini (2024) underscore that information about the true shares and origins of immigrants does not change support for redistribution, while anecdotes on hard-working immigrants move attitudes somewhat but it is not enough to change support for immigration. Similarly, Hopkins et al. (2019) determine that adjusting perceptions about the size of minority groups, such as immigrants, does not affect attitudes towards the group. Grigorieff et al. (2020), in a study carried on in the United States, correct misperceptions on the share of immigrants (living in the country, undocumented, speaking English), as well as on the immigrants unemployment and incarceration rates. Interestingly, their findings are in strong opposition to the confirmation bias: after receiving information about migrants' characteristics, rather than the share of immigrants, respondents with the negative views change their mind about migration. Similarly, Dylong and Uebelmesser (2024) offer to respondents statistical facts about the immigrant population in the host country (e.g. share of immigrants, the unemployment rate of immigrants, and the share of European immigrants among all immigrants) and finds that this decreases respondents' concerns about adverse effects of immigration on the welfare state and slightly move preference for immigration. Haaland and Roth (2020), instead, provide survey respondents with information about research-based evidence showing no adverse labor market impacts of the Mariel boatlift on wages and unemployment in Miami (Card (1990)), and find that the evidence increases their support for a higher level of immigration. Boeri et al. (2024) adopt a more indirect approach by explaining to respondents how the pension system works, allowing them to understand the link between higher labor supply of foreign-born labors and its positive economic effect through the sustainability of the pension system. Our contribution shifts the focus from attitudes towards migrants and policy preferences in terms of immigration level to perceptions and preferences for policy to integrate migrants in the domestic labor market. Our information treatment is based on evidence from academic and policy studies showing that when migrants are well integrated in the labor market, their net contribution to the fiscal balance is positive, natives tend to move to higher-paying jobs, and crime rates decrease significantly.

The role of narrative in shaping attitudes towards migration. Related to the evidence just discussed, a strand of the literature emphasizes the importance of narrative (Cattaneo

and Grieco (2021)). Indeed, how communication and information about migrants are conveyed strongly influences attitudes towards them. Reviewing 68 articles, Dennison (2022) finds that sociotropic concerns matter for attitudinal formation more than individual ones. An effective campaign to shift public attitudes towards migrants should appeal to common interests, emphasize shared values between migrants and the host country, and evoke empathy and emotion. Mirroring this findings, Alesina and Tabellini (2024) and Keita et al. (2024) highlight the role of media and their narrative on migration in shaping natives' views. By reinforcing salience and stereotypes (Alesina et al. (2023)), moving voters closer to parties that rely on an anti-immigrant rhetoric (Giavazzi et al. (2024)), and by spreading of emotionally charged messages, social media can create narratives that reduce the social cost incurred by individuals expressing intolerant views against minorities (Bursztyn et al. (2020)). To test whether emphasising real labor market challenges faced by immigrants can increase policy support more effectively than presenting hard economic facts, one of our treatment consists of three immigrant stories inspired by articles from BBC and The Guardian.

3   The survey

3.1   Data

We collected our data through the survey company YouGov, a global leader in market research and data analytics. The survey was conducted online between June 7 and June 12, 2024 in Canada, Italy, and the United Kingdom. [2]

The countries included in the surveys were selected based on three key criteria. First, each country has experienced substantial inflows of a different type of immigrants (e.g. refugees, economic migrants), ensuring the findings are relevant to a broader set of advanced economies. Furthermore, the 2020 Migrant Integration Policy Index reveals a gap in migrant labor market mobility and integration across all three nations, indicating room for policy improvement. According to the index, Canada scores 76 out of 100 for immigrant labor market mobility and 80 across all the dimensions considered in the index,[3] Italy scores 67 and 58 respectively, and the United Kingdom scores 48 and 56. Lastly, immigration remains a highly relevant issue for the public in all three countries, shaping government policies. For example,

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[2]Before the launch, a pre-analysis plan was registered on AsPredicted and an ethics certificate granted by the German Association for Experimental Economic Research under their expedite review procedure.

[3]In addition to labor market mobility, the dimensions include: family reunion, education, health, political participation, permanent residence, access to nationality, anti-discrimination.

the UK Conservative government introduced several measures to restrict migration between January and April 2024, and both major political parties have pledged in their manifestos to further reduce migration (Migration Observatory commentary, July 2024).

For each country, YouGov targeted a representative sample of respondents, aligned with country-specific demographic distributions, including age, gender, education, employment status, and regional distribution using the sampling and sample matching methodology.[4] Additionally, respondents had to meet the following criteria to qualify for the survey: 1) be a resident of the country in which the survey was conducted; 2) be born in the country; and 3) be 18 years of age or older. A total of 6,300 respondents were selected from the pool for the survey, with 2,100 respondents for each country. To avoid potential biases in responses or selection into the survey, the institutional source of the questionnaire was not disclosed to the respondents.

3.2 Sample

Consistent with YouGov's targeting strategy, the survey sample is broadly representative of each country's general population. Nevertheless, its online nature inevitably results in some deviations from demographic targets. Figure 16 in Appendix A.1 illustrates the differences between the sample averages for quota variables and the population means in each country.

Overall, our survey sample effectively captures each country's target population, with a few country-specific exceptions. In Italy, the only major deviation is among respondents aged over 65, who are under-represented by 10%. For Canada and the UK, in addition to this age-related discrepancy, where the maximum deviation reaches approximately 30%, a second discrepancy is the employment status: the proportion of individuals not in the labor force is about 20% lower than in the general population. Finally, the sample slightly over-represents middle-aged individuals (those aged 30 to 64). The largest age-related deviation occurs in Canada, where respondents aged 30-44 is 9% over-represented compared to the population average. Section 8 presents robustness analysis based on Weighted Least Squares (WLS) and elaborates further on the unemployment discrepancy.

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[4]The sampling and sample matching approach is a two stage process: first a random sample of the target population is chosen (sampling frame) and, in a second step, survey respondents are matched with the sampling frame using propensity scores.

3.3 Structure of the questionnaire

Our survey is structured in seven main sections, as outlined in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Questionnaire outline

First block of demographic questions (age, gender, ethnicity, region)

Pre-treatment beliefs

a. Stereotypes about immigrants [open text box]
b. Trust, universalist views, and zero-sum thinking
c. Knowledge and perceptions about migrant integration policies and their effect on economy and society

| Control Group (no treatment provided) | Policy Effect (qualitative & quantitative info) | Policy Effect + Mechanism (qualitative & quantitative info) | Empathy Treatment (three news-based stories) |

Post-treatment policy support, beliefs and willingess to act

a. Support for policies
b. Zero-sum thinking
c. Knowledge and perceptions about migrant integration policies and their effect on economy and society
d. Real-stake question: willingness to sign a petition in favor and one against integration policies

Reasoning behind position on integration policies

a. Reasons for support or opposition
b. Support when compensatory and complementary measures are provided
c. Ultimate reasons for opposition

Second block of demographic questions

Perception of the survey and the information provided

References and links to the sources for information treatments

The questionnaire structure is the same across the three countries, while the languages, specific demographics questions (such as income, region, political involvement), and treatments were adapted to each country. See Section 3.5 for details. The English version of the full questionnaire for the United Kingdom is attached in Appendix. A.5.

Socioeconomic characteristics: The survey starts by collecting basic demographic and socioeconomic information from respondents, including their age, gender, and whether they live in urban or rural areas. This data ensures that the survey sample is as representative as possible and also allows us to construct demographic control variables for subsequent analyses.

Pre-treatment beliefs: The second section starts by eliciting respondents' tendency for zero-sum thinking, namely the belief that gains for one individual or group come at the cost of others. Those questions are adopted from Chinoy et al. (2024). Next, respondents are presented with an open-ended question to share their impressions about immigrants, without being guided by predetermined categories. This question is placed early in the section to avoid respondents' being primed into thinking about immigrants in particular ways due to subsequent questions. Responses in the open text box are analyzed using large language models (GPT4.o) and categorized into one of four groups: associating immigrants with refugees, associating them with illegal immigrants, positive stereotypes, or negative stereotypes. More precisely, a response is considered a positive (negative) stereotype if it describes positive (negative) personal traits of immigrants or their positive (negative) impact on the host country. Respondents are then asked about their beliefs on whether certain factors pose difficulties for immigrants in finding a job,[5] and their knowledge on whether certain policies can help address these issues.[6] Finally, this section concludes with several questions gathering perceptions of immigration policies aimed at labor market integration. Respondents are asked how government efforts to help immigrants find jobs impact 8 different economic and societal aspects using a scale from 1 (very bad) to 5 (very good). [7]

Treatment: In the third section, respondents are randomly assigned to one of three information treatments or to a control group. The first treatment provides an illustrated slideshow containing research-based information on the benefits of migrant integration policies. It begins by highlighting the overall positive effects of these policies, drawing from findings

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[5]These include: lack of qualifications, language barriers, lack of knowledge about the local labor market, discrimination, exploitation, lack of recognition of foreign qualifications, bureaucracy.

[6]The policies include: free language classes, subsidizing clean energy, cybersecurity policies, job training, recognizing foreign degrees, subsidizing hiring of immigrants, build more roads, and free school for the poor.

[7]These eight categories are: jobs availability, crime rates, public finances, public services availability, cultural diversity, national unity, the economy, and business performance.

from WEO (2020) and Bove and Elia (2017). Given that opposition to immigration is often related to concerns about fiscal burden, loss of natives' wages and jobs, and rising crime rates associated with immigrants, the treatment aims at correcting biased perceptions by presenting evidence of the policies' impact specifically on these three dimensions. The fiscal evidence presented is drawn from a country-specific study by Dustmann et al. (2010) and a cross-country analysis by de Matos (2021) Evidence related to natives' labor market outcomes is sourced form Mitaritonna et al. (2017). Finally, evidence on immigrants' crime rate and the effect of labor market integration is based on multiple academic analysis, including Marie and Pinotti (2024), Ajzenman et al. (2023), and Ward (2022). Within this first treated group, half of respondents received only qualitative information and the other half are complemented with quantitative information (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Snapshots from the first treatment: qualitative versus quantitative

Finally, studies* have found that having more immigrants come in does not make crime rates go up. And **when immigrants are allowed to work legally,** their involvement in **crime goes down significantly.** (*studies by Bocconi University, McGill University, and Stanford University.)

Finally, in many countries, studies* have found that having more immigrants come in does not make crime rates go up. And **when immigrants are allowed to work legally,** their involvement in **crime goes down by 50%.** (*studies by Bocconi University, McGill University, and Stanford University)

The second treatment expands on the first by also explaining how these policies operate, through either qualitative or quantitative lenses. For instance, the faster and better integration of migrants into the labor force can positively impact natives job market outcomes as by filling labor shortages, starting their own business that create jobs, and enabling native workers to transition to higher-skilled jobs and earn higher wages over time.

Finally, the third treatment aims to trigger empathy by sharing real-life stories of immigrants facing obstacles in the labor market, their perseverance, and their successes. This treatment is similar to the anecdotal evidence used in Alesina et al. (2023), as it seeks to reduce the perceived cultural difference between natives and immigrants by highlighting their shared aspirations, e.g.to work, live well, and contribute to society. At the same time, it focuses on labor market barriers that impede efficient skill-matching in some cases and basic labor force integration in others. Moreover, the three stories are inspired by real facts re-

ported in The Guardian and BBC,[8] with each story set in one of the three surveyed countries. Respondents in each country are provided with all three stories to allow for cross-country comparability.

For the same reason, the first two treatments are minimally adjusted to fit the country context. These minor adjustments include changing country specific reference in the illustrations (e.g. the country's flag, the physical traits of illustrated individuals, and any references in the background). Immediately after the treatment, respondent are asked whether they would like to access the links to the relevant research paper and reports, which are then provided at the end of the survey to avoid disrupting the survey flow.

Post-treatment policy support, beliefs and willingness to act: The fourth section of the survey involves three blocks of questions. The first block elicits post-treatment beliefs about zero-sum thinking, where respondents are asked whether they believe policies to support immigrants come at the cost of local residents. The second block elicits post-treatment knowledge, perceptions and support about immigrant integration policies. To gauge the former, individuals are asked to list up to three policies that can help immigrants find a job. To capture perception about the policies, respondents are asked to assess the impact of those policies on the labor market for natives, crime rates, and government tax revenues. Next, to assess policy support, respondents were asked to state their level of overall support for labor market integration policies for immigrants and for four specific policies. These consists of providing work authorization upon arrival, easing the process to recognize immigrants' overseas work experience and qualifications, providing job training and job search assistance, and supporting immigrants in starting new businesses. The final block includes real-stakes questions, where respondents are asked if they would be willing to sign two petitions - one supporting increased migrant integration policies and the other advocating for their reduction.

Reasoning behind position on integration policies: The fifth section explores respondents' reasons for supporting or opposing labor market integration policies for immigrants. Respondents can choose from personal reasons (such as job and wage losses), societal reasons (such as fairness to natives), and provide additional reasons in open-ended answers. Those who oppose the policies are further asked whether their stance would change if certain

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[8]Sources: *My Canadian immigrant story: The foreign credentials struggle* https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40651176, *I struggle not knowing what the future holds - Asylum backlog reaches record high* https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-66603767, *Are your tinned tomatoes picked by slave labour?* https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/20/tomatoes-italy-mafia-migrant-labour-modern-slavery

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complementary policies (such as job training for local workers) were implemented. Finally, those who remain opposed are asked to specify their ultimate reasons for opposition.

Additional socioeconomic characteristics & perceptions of the survey: The sixth section includes additional demographic and socioeconomic questions, which allow us to expand the set of control variables and and study heterogeneous treatment effects. The survey concludes with a final section on respondents' perceptions of the survey (such as perceived political bias), which allows us to conduct robustness analysis, and provide the links to the treatment-specific sources to the treated respondents who indicated their interest in receiving them.

3.4   Randomization in the questionnaire

As documented in the literature, survey responses can be influenced by the interaction between respondents' cognitive biases and the structure of the questionnaire, as well as the design of questions and answers (Stantcheva (2023b), Bogner and Landrock (2016)). To mitigate these concerns, we incorporated several types of randomization into our questionnaire:

1. Question order: In the post-treatment section, the order of questions regarding zero-sum thinking, as well as perceptions and support for immigrant integration policies, are randomized. Additionally, the two petitions were also presented to respondents in random order.

2. Answer order within questions: The order of response options was randomized for questions assessing pre- and post-treatment knowledge and perceptions about immigrant integration policies, post-treatment zero-sum thinking, as well as post-treatment reasons for not supporting the policies.

3. Scales: In the pre- and post-treatment questions about perceptions of immigrants and immigration policies, the order of response scales are randomized. For some respondents, a scale of 1 indicated strong agreement/support and 5 indicated strong disagreement/opposition, while for others, this order was reversed.

4. Order of story blocks: In the empathy treatment, where we present real-life stories about immigrants, the sequence of stories was randomized for each respondent.

3.5 Quality checks

We took several measures to ensure the quality of survey responses. First, to ensure that the survey was well-understood by respondents in different countries and was in line with local customs and norms, the survey questionnaire was administered in local languages and translated by professional translators, and the translation was double checked by native speakers. Moreover, the text and illustrations in the treatment slideshow were tailored to the context of each corresponding country. Second, the questionnaire was pre-tested twice before the survey launch with small groups of participants—once on Prolific and once on the YouGov platform. This approach allowed us to initially use open-ended questions to guide the development of multiple-choice options for some of the final questions. Third, as mentioned in Section 3.4, we randomized the order of certain questions within a block, of the response options within questions and of some Likert scales to reduce the potential impact of priming on survey responses. Moreover, to screen out inattentive respondents, we include two attention-check questions at different parts of the survey, one in a multiple choice format and the other as an open-ended question. Finally, usual cleaning procedures from YouGov were implemented, such as dropping respondents taking too little or too much to reply, and a qualitative review of open-ended answers to drop duplicate, nonsense, inattentive, or potential AI-based based answers.

3.6 Real-stakes questions

One limitation of self-reported answers from the survey questionnaires is that they might not necessarily translate into action. Our setting does not enable us to measure changes in behaviors or policy actions as a result of our information treatment. Yet, several studies in the literature have shown a correlation between survey responses and actual behavior when both can be measured (see Fehr et al. (2021) for an example). In addition, we partially address this concern by including a real-stakes question. More precisely, after eliciting policy support for integration policies, we ask respondents if they would be willing to sign a hypothetical petition, either in support of or against the policy changes mentioned in the survey. While respondents do not get the opportunity to actually see the content of the petition and sign it during the course of survey, the question is asked such that participants could potentially think it will be followed with the link to a real online petition to sign. As a result we interpret responses to our petition questions as indicative of real behavior responses.

4 The role of knowledge and beliefs versus socioeconomic characteristics

We begin by examining respondents' stereotyped views about immigrants and the profile of individuals holding different types of stereotypes. Next, we analyze their perceptions of the impacts of migrant integration policies. We then assess the role of stereotypes and beliefs in shaping support for migrant integration policies, and compare their roles against individual socioeconomic characteristics.

4.1 Stereotypes

We measure stereotypes about immigrants based on respondents' answers in the second block of the survey. As outlined in Section 3, responses to the open-ended question about respondents' impression about immigrants are analyzed using large language models (GPT4.o) and categorized into four groups. Figure 3 shows the distribution of these stereotypes by country. Overall, over 30% of responses highlight positive personal traits of immigrants, such as bravery, hard work, and kindness, or their positive influence on the economy, while around 20% reflect negative personal traits or economic impacts. On the other hand, only about 10% of responses associate immigrants with refugees or illegal immigrants. The proportion of respondents holding positive views of immigrants varies across countries, ranging from 16% in Italy to 40% in the UK.

To characterize the profile of people holding these stereotypes about migrants, we investigate the correlations between stereotypes and socioeconomic characteristics as well as individual beliefs in Figures 17 and 18 in Appendix A.2. Respondents who correctly identify policies to integrate immigrant workers, believe in the positive effects of those policies, or hold universalist views are more likely to express positive stereotypes about immigrants. Moreover, respondents who are more educated, in contact with immigrants, or living in urban areas tend have favorable views. Conversely, respondents with right-leaning political views and those employed in low-skilled occupations tend to view immigrants more negatively.

4.2 Perceived policy effects

Respondents' beliefs about the policy effects on relevant socioeconomic dimensions are illustrated in Figure 4. On average, 42% of respondents believe that policies aimed at helping immigrants find jobs have positive effects on the economy and society. Only 33% think that

Figure 3: Distribution of Stereotypes

Note: This figure shows the proportions of the total sample of 6,300 respondents from each country who hold each type of stereotype about immigrants. Categories include associating immigrants with refugees, associating them with illegal immigrants, holding positive or negative stereotypes.

facilitating job integration would reduce crime rates among immigrants, improve government finances, and increase job availability for natives.

Research indicates that obtaining legal status significantly reduces immigrants' involvement in criminal activities (Marie and Pinotti (2024)). Similarly, cross-country OECD statistics and other studies highlight that immigrants' fiscal net contribution is positive (Dustmann et al. (2010)). Since these studies do not condition the effect on immigrants being officially integrated into the labor market, we could expect the overall net positive effect to be even larger. Furthermore, when immigrants are properly placed and integrated into the workforce, the wages of local workers increase, and more jobs are created (Mitaritonna et al. (2017)). Based on this evidence, we define negative or neutral perceptions of the effects of migrant integration policies as biased.

Figure 4: Perceived policy effects

Note: This figure shows the shares of the total sample of 6,300 respondents believing that migrant integration policies have a positive, negative or null effect on different dimensions of the economy and society.

4.3 Beliefs, socioeconomic characteristics and support

What role do stereotypes and other beliefs play in explaining support or opposition to migrant integration policies? Recent analyses of attitudes towards other policy areas, such as climate policies and employment protection legislation, have found that demographic and socioeconomic characteristics play a relatively minor role in determining policy support compared to beliefs and perceptions about the policy's effects (Duval et al. (2024) Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022); Dabla-Norris et al. (2023)). This evidence highlights a significant policy opportunity: beliefs can be shaped, potentially increasing public support for policies.

To examine the role of individual perceptions and beliefs for migrant integration policies preferences, we follow Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022) and Dabla-Norris et al. (2023) and employ a dominance analysis (Luchman (2021)). The analysis estimate the variance of policy support explained by each of the following clusters of relevant factors, while controlling for country fixed effects.

- *Individual socioeconomic characteristics* include age, education, household income, education level, marital status, gender, ethnicity, government assistance reception, religion, living in urban location, skill occupation, employment status, as well as self-

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reported political orientation.

- *Stereotypes* about immigrants encompass the four variables described in section .

- *General trust and universalism* that mores broadly include trust in the neighbour, in the government, in research, universalism, life satisfaction and interest in politics.

- *Contact with other culture* includes life experiences abroad, and voluntary interactions with immigrants—such as having immigrant parents or friends, or participating in humanitarian activities.

- *Knowledge and perceptions of the impact of migrant integration policies.*

These five clusters enter the following equation:

$$y_{i,c} = \sum_{n=1}^{5} \beta_n X_{i,c,n} + \beta_1 T_{i,c} + \theta_c + u_{i,c} \tag{1}$$

where $y_{i,c}$ is the policy support index, as explained in Section 3, of the individual i in country c, $X_{i,c,n}$, with $n = 1, ...5$ representing each of the variable clusters highlighted above (namely individual's socioeconomic characteristics and the four categories of beliefs). $T_{i,c}$ is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is in one of the treatment groups. The specification includes country fixed effect and robust standard errors.[9]

We use dominance analysis to assess the relative significance of different variable groups within a multiple regression framework, as outlined in Equation 1. This method evaluates the impact of removing each predictor on the model's overall explanatory power, quantified by the regression's R^2. By doing so, it dissects the contribution of each group to the model's overall fit. Figure 5 shows that 86% of of the predictor power lies on beliefs and perceptions. Within this category, understanding what policies can facilitate faster and more effective labor market integration for migrants, along with the perceived effect of these policies on fiscal resources, crime rates and natives' labor market outcomes, accounts for 53% of variations in policy support. Stereotypes about immigrants contribute about 15% to the prediction of support, while socioeconomic characteristics account for only 11%.[10]

To more accurately gauge the correlations between each socioeconomic characteristic and belief with policy support, Equation 2 includes the same covariates but estimates them

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[9]Appendix A.1 reports the list of variables used in the analysis and their definition in Table 3

[10]We run this analysis over the whole sample to maximize precision. However, results are essentially unchanged when the sample is restricted to the control group.

Figure 5: Drivers of migrant integration policy support

Note: The figure shows the relative predictive power of each block of variables. Estimates are obtained through a dominance analysis based on Equation 1 over the cross-country sample. The figures shows standardized dominance statistics.

separately rather than grouping them. $\mathbf{S_{i,c}}$ is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics, $\mathbf{B_{i,c}}$ a vector of beliefs, and $T_{i,c}$ a dummy of whether individual i is in a treatment group.

$$y_{i,c} = \beta_2 \mathbf{S_{i,c}} + \beta_3 \mathbf{B_{i,c}} + \beta_1 T_{i,c} + \theta_c + u_{i,c} \tag{2}$$

We use robust standard errors for confidence intervals and report the results in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Correlation between beliefs and policy support

Note: The figure reports the coefficients based on Equation 2 over the cross-country sample. Policy knowledge and perceived policy effect are standardized across countries to ease the interpretation. All beliefs are pre-treatment expect for universalist views. Zero sum thinking and perceived policy effect are indexes constructed following Anderson (2008) Stereotypes variables are obtain from text analysis of open-ended questions. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Respondents who correctly identify policies for better integrating foreign-born workers or who believe that integrating immigrants can benefit the economy are more likely to support such policies. Similarly, individuals who trust research, hold universalist views, and follow policy debates are more inclined to support these policies. Consistent with Section 4.1, a clear dichotomy emerges regarding the correlation between pre-treatment stereotypes and policy preferences: respondents who have a positive view of immigrants (e.g., seeing them as hardworking), associate immigrants with refugees, or believe that immigration can have positive economic and cultural effects are more likely to support these policies. Conversely, those who associate immigrants with illegal workers or negative economic and cultural outcomes are less likely to support them. Interestingly, zero-sum thinking is not significantly correlated with opposition to migrant integration policies. However, Chinoy et al. (2024) found that in the United States, individuals with a zero-sum mindset tend to support more restrictive migration policies.

Figure 7: Correlation between individual's socioeconomic characteristics and policy support

Note: The figure reports the coefficients based on Equation 2, over the cross-country sample. Since beliefs and perceptions may be influenced by socioeconomic characteristics, in line with a common approach in the literature (see, for example, Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022)), the variables related to individuals' beliefs and perceptions are not included 2 when analyzing the role of socioeconomic characteristics. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Turning to the role of socioeconomic characteristics, as shown in Figure 7, support for migrant integration policies tends to increase with the education level of respondents, as found in previous literature (Alesina et al. (2023); Haaland and Roth (2020)). Support is also higher among individuals familiar with immigrants and other cultures, such as those with immigrant friends, those who have lived abroad, or those involved in charity work. This aligns with previous contributions highlighting the difference between voluntary and forced contact with migrants, where the latter, on the contrary, generates negative attitudes towards migrants. Respondents living in cities, who are non-religious, and females are more supportive of migrants' labor market integration policies. The main reasons cited are that everyone deserves a chance and that such policies would benefit the economy.[11] Politically right-leaning respondents, as well as those of white ethnicity and those working in low-skilled occupations, are more likely to oppose immigration policies, potentially due to concerns about labor market competition. Contrary to earlier findings (Alesina et al. (2023)), individuals receiving government assistance are more inclined to support these policies, possibly reflecting egalitarian views, since the main reason for support among this group is the

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[11]The reasons for support are based only on the control group since the motives come from a post-treatment question.

belief that everyone deserves a chance.

5 Randomized Experiment results

This section presents the effect of each of each treatments on three main variables of interest: policy support, perception of the policy effects and wiliness to sing a petition. In detail:

- Policy support is elicited for the following policies: (i) providing work authorization upon arrival, (i) simplifying the process for recognizing immigrants' overseas work experience and qualifications, (iii) offering job training and job search assistance, and (iv) supporting immigrants in starting new businesses through mentoring, financing, and networking. Support for each policy is measured using a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 'strongly oppose' to 'strongly support.' Following Anderson (2008), the preferences are transformed into country specific z-scores, then aggregated and standardized across countries for ease of interpretation.

- Perceptions about the impact of those policies are elicited with respect to job availability for natives, immigrants' crime rates, and government tax revenues. An index is created with the same methodology used for support.

- Two variables measure the willingness to sing a petition. "Petition against" takes the value 1 for people who said they want to sign the petition in favor of reducing policies that promote the integration of immigrants; and zero otherwise. "Petition in favor" takes the value 1 for people who said they want to sign the petition in favor of increasing policies that promote the integration of immigrants; and value zero otherwise. Cases where individuals intended to sign both petitions, are also be coded as value zero.

The treatment effect is assessed estimating the following equation:

$$y_{i,c} = \beta_1 T_{i,c} + \beta_1 \mathbf{Z}_{i,c} + \theta_c + u_{i,c} \tag{3}$$

where $y_{i,c}$ captures, in turn, support, perception and petition signing. $T_{i,c}$ is the vector of three treatments described in A.5, and $\mathbf{Z}_{i,c}$ is the vector of controls including both socioeconomic and beliefs variables. We use robust standard errors for all specifications. [12]

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[12]Controls include: age, gender, ethnicity, urbanicity (living in large city), marital status, parental status, parents' origins (immigrants or native), educational level, income bracket, unemployment status, occupational

5.1 Policy support

The effect of the information treatment is estimated using Equation 4 on the pooled sample from three countries. All three treatments have a statistically significant impact on policy support (Table 1). Although quantitative information has a slightly higher impact, the difference is not statistically significant. What appears to matter is the content of the information provided, rather than whether it is in qualitative or quantitative form. Informing respondents about the effects of policies is more effective in shifting support, especially when complemented with an explanation of the underlying mechanisms. A simple post-estimation linear hypothesis test confirms the statistical difference. When the effects shown in Table 1 are translated into shares of respondents, the first treatment increases the share of respondents supporting migrant integration policies by 9 percentage points compare to the control group. This effect corresponds to a shift in support equivalent to 30 percent of respondents who oppose migrant integration policies in the control group, while the second treatment increases this share to 42 percent.[13] Although the empathy treatment is also statistically significant, it does not have the same impact as research-based information on policy effects, shifting the share of supporters by only 17 percent.

skill level, government assistance recipient, non-religious, participating in humanitarian activity (voluntary work), with experience living abroad, in voluntary contact with immigrants (friends), self-reported right politically leaning, self-reported extreme right politically leaning, trust in neighbours, trust in government, trust in research , pre-treatment zero sum thinking (index), universalist views, life satisfaction, following policy debate, pre-treatment knowledge of migration policies (index standardized across countries), pre-treatment perception of policy effects (index standardized across countries), perception of immigrants labor market challenges (index standardized across countries), four dummies capturing stereotypes about immigrants (refuges, illegal workers, positive and negative, respectively). This set of controls if broader than the set indicated in the pre-registration. However results do not significantly change as showed in Section 8.2

[13]This calculation is derived from the difference in number of supporters between each treated group and the control group, divided by the number of respondents opposing these policies.

Table 1: Treatment effect on support

	(1)	(2)
	Qualitative and quantitative	Pooled by treatment
Effect of Policies	0.23***	
(Qualitative)	(0.03)	
Effect of Policies + mechanism	0.28***	
(Qualitative)	(0.03)	
Effect of Policies	0.24***	
(Quantitative)	(0.03)	
Effect of Policies + mechanism	0.29***	
(Quantitative)	(0.03)	
Immigrants' stories	0.11***	0.11***
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Effect of Policies		0.23***
		(0.03)
Effect of Policies + mechanism		0.29***
		(0.03)
Obs.	5707	5707
R2 sq	0.53	0.54
Controls	YES	YES
Country fixed effects	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: The first column report the treatment effect on policy support when half of the first two groups received only qualitative information while the other half received also quantitative information on the effect of policies. The second column reports the results of the analysis pooling groups with qualitative and quantitative information. Total observations are less than 6300 since some respondents do not reply to all the questions used as controls.

The sample size in Table 1 is smaller than the whole sample (which has 6300 respondents). In Appendix A.1, Tables 4 and 5, we report the summary statistics, including means and number of non-missing observations, for each variable used in the analysis.

5.2 First stage: effect on beliefs

The working hypothesis behind this analysis is that information leads respondents to update their prior biased beliefs and eventually shift their policy support. Figure 8 confirms this mechanism by showing that perceived policy effects shift following exposure to the treatment. Additionally, informing respondents about the impact of integration policies on immigrants' crime rates (the first and second treatments in Figure 8) and reducing perceived cultural and value differences (the third treatment) significantly affect respondents' beliefs about the link between immigrants and crime relationship across all three treatments. This suggests that misperceptions about foreign-born workers and crime is a key channel influencing support for migrant integration policies. On the other hand, the empathy treatment does not alter respondents' perceptions about the impact of migrant integration policies on government finances and natives' job outcomes. This is not surprising, as the stories presented do not address these aspects.

Figure 8: Treatment on perceived effects of integation policies

- Post-treatment beliefs about the policy effect - Jobs
- Post-treatment beliefs about the policy effect - Govt finances
- Post-treatment beliefs about the policy effect - Less crime

Note: The figure shows the treatment effect on respondents' perceptions about the effect on policies on job availability for natives, government finances, and reduction of immigrants' crime rate, across the three treatment arms. The specification used is the same as in Eq.2. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

5.3 Real-stakes questions

As mentioned in Section 3.6, experimental survey-based analysis is often subject to concerns that self-reported policy preferences may not always align with actual behavior. One way to proxy for actual behaviour is to include questions with real stakes, althugh with some caveats. In this context, we asked respondents about their willingness to sign a petition either in support of or against policy changes.

Table 2: Treatment effect on petition

	(1)	(2)
	Petition in favor	Petition against
Effect of Policies	-0.00	-0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Effect of Policies + mechanism	-0.02	-0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Immigrants' stories	0.01	-0.03***
	(0.02)	(0.01)
Obs.	5708	5708
R2 sq	0.24	0.20
Controls	YES	YES
Country fixed effects	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: The first column report the treatment effect on willingness to sing an hypothetical petition in favor of migrant labor integration policies, the second against. Total observations are less than 6300 since some respondents do not reply to all the questions used as controls.

Table 2 shows that participants who received the information treatment were not more likely to sign a petition in favor of migrant integration policies. However, the share of respondents willing to sign a petition against foreign-born workers' integration reforms significantly decreased due to the treatment. This suggests that the treatment is more effective among respondents initially opposed to integration policies.

One important caveat to consider is that the absence of a significant effect on the willingness to sign a petition in favor of migrant integration policies should be interpreted cau-

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tiously. Previous literature has documented a gap between intentions and actions (Cattaneo and Grieco (2021); Grigorieff et al. (2020)). Although this gap may indicate that the treatment alone might not be sufficient to prompt respondents to take private action (Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022)), various other potential factors may be accountable. These include, for instance, skepticism about the petition's impact, privacy concerns, the need for more information on the reform's specifics, and reluctance to engage in follow-up actions that require time and effort. All these factors could explain why the treatment is more effective in reducing the propensity to sign a petition against the policy than increasing the propensity to sign a petition in favor of it.

We also check to what extent the self-declared support for policies correlates with the willingness to sign a petition. Figure 9 shows the correlations between the willingness to sign petitions in favor(against) migrant integration policies and support for the four immigrant integration policies. The coefficients are estimated based on regressions of petition signing on policy support, controlling for socioeconomic characteristics and country fixed effects. Indeed, respondents showing stronger support for immigrant integration policies are 20% more likely to sign a petition in support of increasing policies to integrate immigrant workers, and over 10% less likely to sign a petition advocating for the opposite.

Figure 9: Correlation between Support for Policies and Petition Signing

Note: This figure presents the regression coefficients of variables representing respondents' level of support for various immigrant integration policies, with the dependent variable being a dummy indicating whether the respondent is willing to sign a petition either in support of or against these policies. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

6 Heterogeneity

6.1 Correcting stereotypes and biased beliefs driven by political views

The importance of explaining the mechanism behind the effect of policies is underscored by the positive heterogeneous effect on respondents with prior negative stereotypes about migrants and with political preference associated with negative views about migrants (Section 4.1). Figure 10 shows the average and marginal effect of the treatments on these two types of respondents as estimated in Equation 4.

$$y_{i,c} = \beta_1 T_{i,c} + D_i * \beta_2 T_{i,c} + \beta_3 D_i + \beta_4 \mathbf{X}_{i,c} + \theta_c + u_{i,c} \tag{4}$$

D_i is a dummy that equals to one if the respondent i associates immigrants with negative stereotypes or identifies as having right leaning political preferences. In both cases, the second treatment (Effect of policies + Mechanism) has a positive and statistically significant effect correcting pre-treatment biased beliefs and shifting beliefs and, consequently, policy

support of individuals that are ex-ante strongly against these types of policies.

Figure 10: Policy support: heterogeneity

Note: The figure presents the treatment average effect on policy support and marginal effects for respondents with pre-treatment negative stereotyped views about immigrants and right leaning respondents, respectively. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

Respondents with negative stereotypes are less likely to sign a petition against migrant integration policies across all three treatment groups (Figure 11). Similarly, individuals with self-declared right-leaning political preferences are less likely to sign when exposed to the second and third treatments.

Figure 11: Petition against: heterogeneity

Note: The figure presents the treatment average effect on willingness to sing a petition against migrant integration policies, as well as the marginal effects for respondents with pre-treatment negative stereotyped views about immigrants and right leaning respondents, respectively. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

When considering the likelihood of signing a petition in favor of integration policies, explaining the mechanism behind the positive effect of integrating migrant is effective in shifting actions by right leaning voters, as shown by Figure 12. This finding is consistent with Grigorieff et al. (2020), who find that, in the United States, Republicans become more willing to increase legal immigration after receiving statistical information correcting their beliefs regarding the fraction of legal and undocumented immigrants, the share of immigrants being incarcerated or unemployed, and the share of English-speaking immigrants.

Figure 12: Petition in favor: heterogeneity

Note: The figure presents the treatment average effect on willingness to sing a petition in favor of migrant integration policies, as well as the marginal effects for respondents with pre-treatment negative stereotyped views about immigrants and right leaning respondents, respectively. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

To better gauge the marginal effect on respondents' actions, we created a synthesized variable that takes the value one if the respondent is willing to sign a petition in favor, zero if she/he is willing to sign both or neither of them, and minus one, if she/he is willing to sing a petition against. Overall, respondents with negative pre-treatment views about immigrants are more positively incline to take action in support of these policy than the average individual. This is also the case for right-wing voters, although only when the economic mechanisms are explained. These findings suggests a strong role for information strategies in shifting people's prior beliefs.

Figure 13: Real stakes question: overall index, heterogeneity

Note: The figure presents the treatment average effect on the willingness to sing a petition as well as the marginal effects for respondents with pre-treatment negative stereotyped views about immigrants and right leaning respondents, respectively. The petition index captures whether respondent is willing to sign a petition in favor(-1) or against migrant integration policies (-1), or null if no preference is expressed. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

6.2 Cross-country heterogeneity

When looking at cross-country heterogeneity, results are robust and mostly invariant at country level, as shown in Figure 14. The effects in the United Kingdom are sightly stronger across the first two treatments and all the three treatments decrease the likelihood of signing a petition against migrant integration policies.[14]

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[14]Results are on the petition in favor of the policy change are insignificant and omitted for space constraints.

Figure 14: Treatment effect by country

Note: The figure reports the country level estimated treatment effect on policy support and willingness to sign a petition against migrant integration policies. The specification used is the same as in Eq.2.The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

7 The role of mitigation policies

Although the integration of foreign workforce is associated with an overall positive effect on the economy, frictions and distributional effects can materialize in the short to medium term. In fact, previous literature finds that migrant integration may entail some degrees of labor reallocation between natives and immigrant workers, with some upskilling and occupational upgrading of the former group (Mitaritonna et al. (2017)). The same applies to public service provision: although on average immigrants contribute more to public finances than the benefits they receive, some frictional costs can arise in certain contexts that require a scaling-up of public services - such as public transports, health care and schools. We measure, post-treatment, how important these concerns are among survey respondents. We do so without conditioning on the respondents probability of being directly affected by transitional frictions. As highlighted in Section 4.3 and previous literature, beliefs play an important role determining the demand for government intervention . Hence, fear of negative distributional

or negative side effects is the relevant variable of interest to understand what the ultimate reasons of opposition to integration reforms is.

We focus on respondents that oppose integration policies post-treatment, and investigate what the reasons behind their opposition are.[15] The most common reasons for not supporting migrant integration policies relates to societal concerns: fairness to natives and free riding fiscal resources (Figure 15, blue bars).[16] The former indicates that respondents either fear that helping immigrants to find jobs will subtract government support to natives seeking for employment, or think that natives' employment should come first. Crowding out public services (school, public transports and hospital) is the first personal concern mentioned, followed by fear of increasing housing costs. Security concerns come much lower in the list with respect to other surveys on immigration (Dennison and Dražanová (2018)), likely due to treatment effects.

Figure 15: Reasons for non-support migrant integration policies

Note: On the left hand chart, the blue bars capture the share of responses among the non-supporters, by concern related to the policy change. On the right hand charts, the yellow bars represent the share of respondents that would change mind and opt for support if mitigation measures were to be implemented.

Most of these concerns can actually be addressed with adequate additional measures. In fact, an abundant strand of literature on labor market productivity found that active labor mar-

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[15]Respondents are first prompted to discuss their concerns in an open box and, subsequently to choose among a list that has been refined throughout two rounds of pilot surveys int he UK. Finally they can include additional reasons to the list.

[16]Since respondents could select multiple reasons, percentages in the figures should interpreted as share of total responses, not as share of respondents.

ket policies can help to reduce resources reallocation costs (Le Barbanchon et al. (2024)). In addition, migration specific studies also highlighted how compensatory and complementary measures can smooth potential integration costs (WEO (2020)).

Based on these considerations, the questionnaire proposes hypothetical scenarios where the government commits to implement mitigation strategies, in the form of compensatory or complementary policies, for each of the concerns. Examples of the proposed measures include ensuring that policies to better integrate migrants in the labor market will not decrease government assistance for natives and improving the coordination with other countries to allocate of workers where most needed - including the country surveyed. Figure 15 shows that providing policies that would directly address their concerns and mitigate them would convert around 50% of non-supporters into supporters, on average (yellow bar).

Finally, we follow-up among the remaining non-supporters with additional questions to uncover that the ultimate reasons for opposition. We identify that among these ultimate non-supporters a lack of trust in government's ability and commitment to effectively implement both the policies and the mitigation measures is the most commonly picked answer. (54% on average). Additional reasons include a preference for not having foreign worker in the country (15%), doubts about the effectiveness of policies of feasibility of policies or of the accompanying mitigation strategies (11%), job concerns (7%), concerns about limited fiscal resources (7%), and other reasons (6%). These results suggest two important takeaways. First, listening to people concerns about the reform and addressing them through complementary and compensatory measures could potentially help to build consensus in advance of the reform implementation. Second, the root of public opposition of policy changes lies in the lack of trust in institutions. Thus improving credibility and trust in institutions, curbing corruption, and designing adequate mechanisms to build confidence around the reform are key ingredient for social acceptability of migrant integration polices.

8 Robustness

This section discusses the results of the following robustness checks: testing for randomization, using an alternative support variable and different controls sets, estimating a weighted OLS model, and dropping respondents who think that the survey is either left-wing or right-wing biased.

8.1 Test of randomization

To examine whether our survey treatment leads to differential attrition patterns among respondents with different characteristics and therefore *de facto* selection into treatment groups, we need to test whether the sample is balanced between the treatment groups and the control group, along the socioeconomic characteristics considered in the baseline results. Table 8 in the Appendix presents results of *t*-tests between the control group and the treatment group, where the treatment group consists of respondents in all treatment branches.

Results from *t*-tests indicate that most characteristics do not show any statistically significant difference between the two groups, with the exception of gender and education level. In particular, males and respondents with lower education levels (i.e. high school only) are less likely to remain in the treatment group. However, the *p*-value of the likelihood ratio test of joint insignificance of all variables' differences is 0.32, suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two samples are balanced along socioeconomic characteristics.

In Appendix A.4, Tables 9, 10 and 11, we present additional balance tests for each treatment branch respectively. The only characteristic that remains to be statistically significant between treatment groups in different branches and the control group is gender: the statistical difference of male participation rates are always statistically significantly higher in the control group.

8.2 Alternative support variable and control sets

As explained in Section 3, the main outcome variable is a policy support index based on respondents' preferences for four different integration measures. Alternatively, considering overall migrant-integration policy support as the dependent variable confirms the effectiveness of the treatments, although the effects are lower (Appendix A.3 Table 7, column 1). This discrepancy could arise because, unlike a single question on overall policy support, the index specifies the scope of policy interventions, which might help avoid misunderstandings and prevent reluctance due to uncertainty over the policy measures.

Results are robust, with minimal differences, to alternative specifications: (i) using a subset of controls, specified int he pre-registration, and (ii) dropping all controls, as reported in column 2 and 3, respectively, in the Appendix A.3 Table 7.

8.3 Weighted ordinary least squares

Significant discrepancies between the population target and the sample may warrant sample weighting. However, in some instances, weights are not strictly required (Solon et al. (2015)). A first criteria to prefer unweighted ordinary least squares (OLS) is when using weights reduces the precision of estimates due to the added noise from boosting the weight of the intersection of demographic cells that are very difficult to capture, even when employing robust standard errors. In our case these are unemployed people living in rural areas. Second, wherever there is not a clear endogenous sampling problem in terms of sample selection, weights are not strictly required. Since this is a large scale survey conducted online, there is no clear correlation between people accessing the YouGov platform and the topic of the survey. However, we test for heterogeneous effect in terms of unemployment and income of respondents and re-estimate the main model with weighted Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The analysis (column 4 of Table 7 in the Appendix A.3) does not reveal any significant difference with the baseline, confirming the appropriateness of using unweighted OLS analysis due to the gain in precision at no apparent cost.

8.4 Dropping respondents perceiving the survey as biased

In the final part of the questionnaire, following Dechezleprêtre et al. (2022), we asked respondents about their perceptions about the political bias of the survey. In this section, we drop respondents who think that the survey is either left-wing or right-wing biased. The effects of different treatments on policy support and petition signing are shown in Appendix A.3 Table 6.

The coefficients are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline results shown in Tables 1 and 2, indicating that the treatment effects are robust in the sub-sample of respondents who think that the survey is un-biased.

9   Conclusion

This study analyzes the factors influencing public support for migrant integration policies through an information experiment administered to 6,300 individuals in Canada, Italy and United Kingdom. Our findings suggest that individuals' beliefs about immigrants, especially stereotyped views, as well as awareness and understanding of integration policies play a more significant role than socioeconomic factors in shaping policy support. An informa-

tion treatment providing empirical evidence about the policies effects on the economy and society and explaining how the policies operate is effective in shifting prior biased perceptions, eventually increasing policy support. The importance of explaining the mechanism behind the effect of policies is underscored by the positive heterogeneous effect on respondents with prior negative stereotypes about migrants and those with political preferences associated with negative views about migrants.

Eliciting respondents' barrier to policy support, we find that fairness towards unemployed native workers comes across as the primary concern, followed by fiscal burden concerns and fear of overcrowded public services. However, policy support increases significantly when integration policies are paired with mitigation measures addressing these concerns. This evidence highlights the importance of comprehensive policy designs that include both migrant integration policies and compensatory measures. Finally, the ultimate reason for opposition to these policies lies in the mistrust of governments' ability and willingness to effectively implement these policies and the accompanying mitigation strategies. The findings highlight that addressing public concerns through informative communication and well-crafted measures can enhance support for migrant integration policies and unlock growth opportunities.

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A Appendix

A.1 Sample statistics and variables description

Figure 16: Difference between Sample Averages and Population Means

(a) United Kingdom

(b) Italy

(c) Canada

Note: This figure shows the differences between the sample averages and population means for the quota variables in each country. The dots represent the point estimates, and the capped spikes illustrate the 95% confidence intervals.

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Table 3: Variables Description

Variable	Description
Age	Age brackets: 18-29, 30-44, 45-64, over 65
Gender	Dummy=1 if the respondent is female
Ethnicity	Dummy=1 if the respondent is white
Urbanicity (living in large city)	Dummy=1 if the respondent lives in a large city
Marital Status	Dummy=1 if the respondent is married
Parental Status	Dummy=1 if the respondent has children
Parents' Origins	Dummy=1 if respondent's parents are immigrants
Educational Level	Brackets: Less than high school, High school, Graduate school, Post-graduate
Income Brackets	Quartiles by country
Unemployment Status	Dummy=1 if the respondent is unemployed
Occupational Skill Level	Dummy=1 if the respondent's occupation required low skills
Government Assistance Recipient	Dummy=1 if the respondent receives government assistance
Non-religious	Dummy=1 if the respondent declares not to belong to any religion, or she/he is atheist, agnostic.
Participating in Humanitarian Activity	Dummy=1 if the respondent is engaged in voluntary work
With Experience Living Abroad	Dummy=1 if respondent has experience living abroad
In Voluntary Contact with Immigrants	Dummy=1 if the respondent has immigrant friends or participates in humanitarian activity with immigrants.
Self-reported Right Politically Leaning	Dummy=1 if the self-declared political orientation>6, where 10 if extreme right.
Self-reported Extreme Right Politically Leaning	Dummy=1 if the self-declared political orientation is 9 or 10.
Trust in Neighbors	Dummy=1 if the respondent's trust in neighbours is 4 or 5 in a 1-5 scale.
Trust in Government	Dummy=1 if the respondent's confidence in government is 4 or 5 in a 1-5 scale.
Trust in Research	Dummy=1 if the respondent's confidence in research is 4 or 5 in a 1-5 scale.
Pre-treatment Zero Sum Thinking	Anderson index.
Universalist Views	Question borrowed from Cappelen et al. (2022).
Life Satisfaction	Dummy=1 if respondent declare to have a life satisfaction>6 in a scale 1-10.
Following Policy Debate	Dummy=1 if the respondent follows the policy news most of the time or some time.
Pre-treatment Knowledge of Migration Policies	Anderson index further standardized across counties.
Pre-treatment Perception of Policy Effects	Anderson index further standardized across counties.
Perception of Immigrants' Labor Market Challenges	Dummy=1 if the respondent classifies correctly at least 4 policies over the 8 proposed.
	Six of these are related to integration policies and two are unrelated.
Four Dummies Capturing Stereotypes about Immigrants	Dummy for refugees, illegal workers, positive and negative, respectively.
	See section for details on the construction.
Policy support Index	Anderson index further standardized across counties.
Overall policy support	Anderson index further standardized across counties.

Note: The Anderson (2008) index creates a summary index from multiple variables. This approach is used to synthesize (i) multiple questions on zero sum thinking, (ii) beliefs about the effect of policies on multiple economic and social dimensions, (iii) knowledge about different migrant policy integration measures, (iii) beliefs about multiple challenges for migrant labor market integration, and (iv) support for multiple policy measures. Each index is constructed as weighted average of Z-score variables calculated with respect to the control group of the country for each sub-question considered, e.g. policy measure, category, etc.

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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Socio-Economic Characteristics

	mean	count
Age	48.80	6300
Male	0.459	6300
White	0.861	6300
Live in a large city	0.225	6300
Married	0.482	6300
Have children	0.569	6300
Has an immigrant parent	0.214	6300
High school educated	0.290	6300
Post-secondary or college educated	0.417	6300
Post-graduate	0.147	6300
1st income quartile	0.313	6300
2nd income quartile	0.252	6300
3rd income quartile	0.169	6300
Unemployed	0.113	6300
Low-skilled occupations	0.321	6299
Receives gov't assistance	0.128	6167
Not religious	0.354	6300
Participating in humanitarian activities	0.127	6300
Lived abroad	0.194	6300
In contact with immigrants	0.608	6300
Self-declared right political leaning	0.225	6300
Self-declared extreme right political leaning	0.0667	6300

This table presents the means and the number of non-missing observations for each socio-economic character-istic. The total sample size is 6,300.

Table 5: Summary Statistics of Beliefs

	mean	count
Trust in neighbors	0.753	6072
Trust in government	0.330	6217
Trust in research	0.855	6035
Zero-sum thinking	0.0351	6300
Universalist views	0.475	6300
Life satisfaction	0.688	6300
Following policy debate	0.686	6300
Policy knowledge	0.00260	6300
Perceived policy effects	0.000214	6295
Perceived integration challenges	-3.11e-09	6296
Assoc immigrants with illegal immigrants	0.0216	6300
Assoc immigrants with refugees	0.0897	6300
Positive stereotypes about immigrants	0.307	6300
Negative stereotypes about immigrants	0.207	6300

This table presents the means and the number of non-missing observations for each variable reflecting respondents' views and beliefs. The total sample size is 6,300.

Figure 17: Correlation between Stereotypes about Immigrants and Socioeconomic Characteristics

(a) Positive Stereotype

(b) Negative Stereotype

(c) Illegal Immigrants

(d) Refugees

Note: This figure shows the regression coefficients of variables reflecting respondents' views and beliefs, with the dependent variable being a dummy indicating the type of stereotype about immigrants. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

A.2 Determinants of stereotypes about immigrants

Figure 18: Correlation between Stereotypes about Immigrants and Individual Beliefs

(a) Positive Stereotype

(b) Negative Stereotype

(c) Illegal Immigrants

(d) Refugees

Note: This figure shows the regression coefficients of socioeconomic characteristics, with the dependent variable being a dummy indicating the type of stereotype about immigrants. The dots indicate the point estimates, and the spikes represent the 95% confidence intervals.

A.3 Robustness checks

Table 6: Treatment effect on support and petitions: robustness checks

	(1) Qualitative and quantitative	(2) Pooled by treatment	(3) Petition in favor	(4) Petition against
Effect of Policies (Qualitative)	0.23*** (0.04)			
Effect of Policies (Quantitative)	0.23*** (0.04)			
Effect of Policies + mechanism (Qualitative)	0.28*** (0.04)			
Effect of Policies + mechanism (Quantitative)	0.30*** (0.04)			
Effect of Policies		0.23*** (0.03)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.02** (0.01)
Effect of Policies + mechanism		0.29*** (0.03)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)
Immigrants' stories'	0.09*** (0.03)	0.09*** (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)	-0.03** (0.01)
Obs.	4018	4018	4019	4019
R2	0.50	0.50	0.24	0.15
Controls	YES	YES	Yes	Yes
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	Yes	Yes

Standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Note: The first column report the treatment effect on policy support when half of the first two groups received only qualitative information while the other half received also quantitative information on the effect of policies. The second column reports the results of the analysis pooling groups with qualitative and quantitative information. The sample is limited to respondents who think that the survey is unbiased.

Table 7: Treatment effect on support: robustness checks

	(1) Overall index	(2) No controls	(3) PAP controls	(4) WLS
Effect of Policies	0.17***	0.25***	0.23***	0.21***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Effect of Policies + mechanism	0.11***	0.29***	0.30***	0.27***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Immigrants' stories'	0.09***	0.10***	0.12***	0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Obs.	5708	6299	6208	5707
R2 sq	0.23	0.01	0.51	0.55
Controls	PAP controls	NO	YES	YES
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Note: The first column reports the treatment effect on standardized overall policy support instead of using the composite index. Column 2 shows the treatment effect on the support index using the unweighted baseline specification but without controls. Column 3 reports the baseline estimates using the pre-registered subset of controls. Finally, column 4 report the weighted OLS estimates.

Table 8: Balance Test of Covariates between Treatment and Control Groups: All Treatments

Variable	Treated	Control	t	p-value
Age 18-29	0.14	0.14	-0.59	0.554
Age 30-44	0.27	0.27	-0.13	0.899
Age 45-64	0.40	0.41	-0.62	0.537
Female	0.54	0.50	2.84	0.005
White	0.86	0.86	0.41	0.685
Live in a large city	0.23	0.22	0.97	0.330
Married	0.48	0.48	0.03	0.977
Have children	0.57	0.55	1.54	0.123
Have an immigrant parent	0.21	0.22	-0.26	0.791
High school only	0.28	0.31	-2.19	0.028
Post-secondary or college	0.42	0.41	0.92	0.358
Post-graduate	0.15	0.15	0.14	0.895
1st income quartile	0.32	0.30	1.00	0.318
2nd income quartile	0.26	0.24	1.42	0.156
3rd income quartile	0.17	0.17	-0.37	0.712
Unemployed	0.11	0.11	-0.33	0.742
Low-skilled occupation	0.32	0.33	-1.13	0.259
Receive government assistance	0.13	0.13	-0.32	0.747
Not religious	0.35	0.36	-1.09	0.274
Humanitarian activities	0.13	0.13	0.03	0.978
Lived abroad	0.20	0.18	0.60	0.549
In contact with immigrants	0.61	0.62	-0.54	0.593
Politically right-leaning	0.23	0.23	-1.24	0.524
Politically extremely right-leaning	0.06	0.07	-1.18	0.240
Trust in neighbors	0.75	0.75	0.53	0.594
Trust in government	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.750
Trust in research	0.86	0.85	0.28	0.782
Zero-sum thinking	0.05	0.00	1.62	0.106
Universalist views	0.48	0.46	1.58	0.114
Life satisfaction	0.69	0.69	-0.28	0.777
Following policy debate	0.68	0.69	-0.72	0.472
Policy knowledge	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.904
Perceived policy effects	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.992
Perceived integration challenges	0.01	-0.02	0.49	0.626
Assoc immigrants with illegal immigrants	0.02	0.02	1.12	0.265
Associate immigrants with refugees	0.09	0.09	0.34	0.703
Positive stereotypes	0.30	0.32	-1.01	0.311
Negative stereotypes	0.21	0.20	0.22	0.828

Note: This table presents the results of a balance test for regression covariates between the treatment and control groups, where the treatment group includes respondents from all three treatment branches. The "Treated" and "Control" columns report the means of each variable in their respective sub-samples.

A.4 Additional balance tests of covariates

Table 9: Balance Test of Covariates between Treatment and Control Groups: Policy Effects Treatment

Variable	Treated	Control	t	p-value
Age 18-29	0.14	0.14	-0.12	0.903
Age 30-44	0.27	0.27	0.13	0.898
Age 45-64	0.38	0.41	-1.70	0.089
Female	0.55	0.50	2.51	0.012
White	0.86	0.86	-0.18	0.861
Live in a large city	0.22	0.22	-0.10	0.917
Married	0.49	0.48	0.44	0.735
Have children	0.56	0.55	0.60	0.549
Immigrant parent	0.21	0.22	-0.16	0.872
High school only	0.29	0.31	-1.52	0.129
Post-secondary or college	0.41	0.41	0.38	0.702
Post-graduate	0.15	0.15	0.45	0.653
1st income quartile	0.31	0.30	0.43	0.665
2nd income quartile	0.26	0.26	-1.18	0.237
3rd income quartile	0.19	0.17	1.02	0.306
Unemployed	0.12	0.11	0.04	0.969
Low-skilled occupation	0.30	0.33	-1.78	0.075
Receive government assistance	0.13	0.13	-0.15	0.881
Not religious	0.35	0.36	-1.05	0.294
Humanitarian activities	0.13	0.13	0.35	0.723
Lived abroad	0.19	0.18	0.34	0.734
In contact with immigrants	0.59	0.60	-0.66	0.513
Politically right-leaning	0.21	0.23	-1.70	0.089
Politically extremely right-leaning	0.05	0.07	-1.29	0.198
Trust in neighbors	0.76	0.75	0.64	0.524
Trust in government	0.34	0.33	0.68	0.494
Trust in research	0.85	0.85	-0.05	0.961
Zero-sum thinking	0.03	0.00	0.93	0.352
Universalist views	0.48	0.46	1.12	0.262
Life satisfaction	0.68	0.66	0.04	0.971
Following policy debate	0.68	0.69	-0.49	0.621
Policy knowledge	0.02	0.00	0.66	0.508
Perceived policy effects	0.02	0.00	0.62	0.537
Perceived integration challenges	0.01	-0.02	0.04	0.985
Assoc immigrants with illegal immigrants	0.03	0.02	1.40	0.166
Assoc immigrants with refugees	0.09	0.09	0.14	0.889
Positive stereotypes	0.30	0.32	-0.86	0.391
Negative stereotypes	0.20	0.20	-0.38	0.707

Note: This table presents the results of a balance test for regression covariates between the treatment and control groups, where the treatment group includes respondents who received information about the effects of immigrant integration policies. The "Treated" and "Control" columns report the means of each variable in their respective sub-samples.

Table 10: Balance Test of Covariates between Treatment and Control Groups: Policy Effects + Mechanism Treatment

Variable	Treated	Control	t	p-value
Age 18-29	0.13	0.14	-0.98	0.326
Age 30-44	0.27	0.27	-0.34	0.734
Age 45-64	0.41	0.41	0.17	0.866
Female	0.55	0.50	2.37	0.018
White	0.87	0.86	0.73	0.465
Live in a large city	0.24	0.22	1.60	0.109
Married	0.49	0.48	0.64	0.523
Have children	0.59	0.55	2.29	0.022
Immigrant parent	0.21	0.22	-0.56	0.578
High school only	0.28	0.31	-1.72	0.086
Post-secondary or college	0.42	0.41	0.53	0.596
Post-graduate	0.14	0.15	-0.14	0.893
1st income quartile	0.31	0.30	0.35	0.724
2nd income quartile	0.26	0.24	1.07	0.284
3rd income quartile	0.15	0.17	-1.48	0.140
Unemployed	0.11	0.11	-0.23	0.817
Low-skilled occupation	0.31	0.33	-1.38	0.168
Receive government assistance	0.13	0.13	-0.23	0.819
Not religious	0.35	0.36	-0.80	0.423
Humanitarian activities	0.13	0.13	0.10	0.922
Lived abroad	0.21	0.18	2.08	0.038
In contact with immigrants	0.62	0.60	1.22	0.223
Politically right-leaning	0.22	0.23	-0.55	0.580
Politically extremely right-leaning	0.07	0.07	-0.55	0.584
Trust in neighbors	0.76	0.75	0.82	0.412
Trust in government	0.32	0.33	-0.51	0.607
Trust in research	0.86	0.85	0.72	0.471
Zero-sum thinking	0.06	0.00	1.81	0.071
Universalist views	0.48	0.46	1.31	0.191
Life satisfaction	0.70	0.69	0.72	0.471
Following policy debate	0.69	0.69	-0.40	0.691
Policy knowledge	0.00	0.00	-0.12	0.888
Perceived policy effects	-0.01	0.00	-0.36	0.720
Perceived integration challenges	0.03	-0.02	0.86	0.389
Assoc immigrants with illegal immigrants	0.02	0.02	0.62	0.535
Assoc immigrants with Refugees	0.09	0.09	0.05	0.962
Positive stereotypes	0.31	0.32	-0.13	0.896
Negative stereotypes	0.21	0.20	0.61	0.541

Note: This table presents the results of a balance test for regression covariates between the treatment and control groups, where the treatment group consists of respondents who received information on the effects of immigrant integration policies, along with an explanation of the mechanisms through which these policies operate. The "Treated" and "Control" columns report the means of each variable in their respective sub-samples.

Table 11: Balance Test of Covariates between Treatment and Control Groups: Empathy Treatment

Variable	Treated	Control	t	p-value
Age 18-29	0.14	0.14	-0.34	0.734
Age 30-44	0.27	0.27	-0.10	0.922
Age 45-64	0.41	0.41	-0.01	0.995
Female	0.54	0.50	2.05	0.040
White	0.86	0.86	0.48	0.635
Live in a large city	0.23	0.22	0.78	0.433
Married	0.47	0.48	-0.89	0.376
Have children	0.57	0.55	1.03	0.302
Immigrant parent	0.22	0.22	0.02	0.985
High school only	0.28	0.31	-2.07	0.038
Post-secondary or college	0.43	0.41	1.32	0.187
Post-graduate	0.15	0.15	0.01	0.988
1st income quartile	0.31	0.30	1.94	0.052
2nd income quartile	0.25	0.24	0.64	0.524
3rd income quartile	0.17	0.17	-0.36	0.718
Unemployed	0.18	0.11	-0.60	0.545
Low-skilled occupation	0.34	0.33	-0.36	0.717
Receive government assistance	0.13	0.13	-0.41	0.687
Not religious	0.35	0.36	-0.82	0.412
Humanitarian activities	0.12	0.13	-0.69	0.493
Lived abroad	0.19	0.18	0.60	0.550
In contact with immigrants	0.62	0.62	0.73	0.464
Politically right-leaning	0.24	0.23	0.60	0.547
Extremely politically right-leaning	0.08	0.07	-0.26	0.792
Trust in neighbors	0.75	0.75	-0.08	0.934
Trust in government	0.32	0.33	0.60	0.546
Trust in research	0.85	0.85	0.00	1.000
Zero-sum thinking	0.04	0.00	1.21	0.225
Universalist views	0.48	0.46	1.31	0.191
Life satisfaction	0.68	0.69	-0.06	0.951
Following policy debate	0.68	0.69	-0.86	0.389
Policy knowledge	0.01	0.00	-0.21	0.829
Perceived policy effects	0.01	0.00	-0.22	0.825
Perceived integration challenges	0.00	-0.02	0.32	0.751
Assoc immigrants with illegal immigrants	0.02	0.02	0.76	0.446
Assoc immigrants with refugees	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.324
Positive stereotypes	0.29	0.32	-1.47	0.141
Negative stereotypes	0.21	0.20	0.28	0.780

Note: This table presents the results of a balance test for regression covariates between the treatment and control groups, where the treatment group consists of respondents who were shown three news-based stories about the obstacles immigrants face in finding employment. The "Treated" and "Control" columns report the means of each variable in their respective sub-samples.

A.5   Questionnaire

Below are the links to the English versions of the questionnaires for each country:

- Canada

- Italy

- United Kingdom

The remaining of the annex presents the full questionnaire for the United Kingdom.

UK Questionnaire

Notes in italics are for exposition purposes and are not shown to respondents.

Figure 1 – Survey Flow (on following page)

First block of demographic questions (age, gender, ethnicity, region)

⬇

Pre-treatment beliefs

a. Stereotypes about immigrants [open text box]
b. Trust, universalist views, and zero-sum thinking
c. Knowledge and perceptions about migrant integration policies and their effect on economy and society

⬇

Control Group (no treatment provided)	Policy Effect (qualitative & quantitative info)	Policy Effect + Mechanism (qualitative & quantitative info)	Empathy Treatment (three news-based stories)

⬇

Post-treatment policy support, beliefs and willingess to act

a. Support for policies
b. Zero-sum thinking
c. Knowledge and perceptions about migrant integration policies and their effect on economy and society
d. Real-stake question: willingness to sign a petition in favor and one against integration policies

⬇

Reasoning behind position on integration policies

a. Reasons for support or opposition
b. Support when compensatory and complementary measures are provided
c. Ultimate reasons for opposition

⬇

Second block of demographic questions

⬇

Perception of the survey and the information provided

⬇

References and links to the sources for information treatments

First Block of Demographics Questions

1. Which year were you born?
    Drop down menu including years from 1900-2024

2. What is your gender?
    1. Man
    2. Woman
    3. Non-binary
    4. Other

3. What ethnic group best describes you? Please select one option only. *(We ask the question in this way so that it is consistent with Census definitions.)*

    1. English / Welsh / Scottish / Northern Irish / British
    2. Irish
    3. Gypsy or Irish Traveller
    4. Any other White background
    5. White and Black Caribbean
    6. White and Black African
    7. White and Asian
    8. Any other Mixed / Multiple ethnic background
    9. Indian
    10. Pakistani
    11. Bangladeshi
    12. Chinese
    13. Any other Asian background
    14. African
    15. Caribbean
    16. Any other Black / African / Caribbean background
    17. Arab
    18. Any other ethnic group
    19. Prefer not to say

4. Which area of the UK do you live in?
    1. North East
    2. North West
    3. Yorkshire and the Humber
    4. East Midlands
    5. West Midlands
    6. East of England
    7. London
    8. South East
    9. South West
    10. Wales
    11. Scotland
    12. Northern Ireland
    13. Non UK & Invalid

5. In what sort of place do you currently live?
    1. Rural area or village
    2. Small or middle sized town
    3. Large town

6. Which **three** words are days of the week? Please select all **three** that apply.

Answer choices appear in random order

1. Monday
2. Tuesday
3. Wednesday
4. December
5. August

Consent

This is a survey for academic research. Our goal is to understand your views on certain policies. By completing this survey, you are contributing to our knowledge as a society. It takes about 20 minutes to complete the survey.

Please note that it is very important for the success of our research that you **answer honestly** and **read the questions very carefully** before answering. If at any time you don't know an answer, please give your best guess **without consulting any external sources.** However, please be sure to spend enough time reading and understanding the questions.

In exchange for your participation, you will receive 150 points credited to your YouGov account.

Notes: Your participation in this study is purely voluntary, and you may withdraw your participation or your data at any time without any penalty to you. Your name will never be recorded. Results may include summary data, but you will never be identified. If you have any questions about this study, you may contact us at surveypeople2024@gmail.com.

7. YOU MUST BE **A BRITISH RESIDENT** AND **BORN IN THE UK** TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SURVEY
   1. Yes, I would like to take part in this study, and I confirm that I was born in the UK, currently reside there, and am 18 or older
   2. No, I would not like to participate

Zero-Sum Thinking

First, we would like to hear your views on different societal topics. Please answer the following questions.
8. How much do you agree with the following statement: "In the UK, there are many different income classes. If one group becomes wealthier, it is usually the case that this comes at the expense of other groups"?
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Neither agree nor disagree
   4. Disagree
   5. Strongly disagree

9. How much do you agree with the following statement? When you think about international trade:
If a country grows and becomes richer, this generally comes at the expense of other countries.
   1. Strongly agree
   2. Agree
   3. Neither agree nor disagree
   4. Disagree
   5. Strongly disagree

Immigrant Perceptions

10. Some people think that the government should only support British citizens. Others think that the government should care equally about all the people living in the country, regardless of their country of origin. Think of a scale where 1 means that the government should focus on supporting British citizens and 7 means that the government should care equally about everyone living in The United Kingdom. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest to the way you feel?
Selections are the numbers 1-7

11. Think of people who moved to the UK from other countries (immigrants). Which characteristics of immigrants come to your mind? Please describe your thoughts. It can be a three to five words or a sentence.

12. Do you think that the following factors pose difficulties for immigrants to find a job?

Statement	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
They lack the required qualification	○	○	○	○	○
They don't speak English	○	○	○	○	○
They are not familiar with the British labour market	○	○	○	○	○
They are often discriminated by employers and co-workers	○	○	○	○	○
They are often exploited by employers	○	○	○	○	○
Their foreign qualifications are not recognized in the UK	○	○	○	○	○
Excessive bureaucratic paperwork to obtain and renew working permits	○	○	○	○	○

13. Below there is a list of government policies. Which ones can be used to help immigrants find jobs? Please tick all that apply.

Answer choices appear in random order

1. Give free classes to learn English
2. Financially support individuals and businesses that switch to renewable energy sources like wind or solar power
3. Take steps to protect the internet and computers from hacking threats
4. Offer training programs at no cost to teach new skills needed for various jobs
5. Accept workers with school degrees and certificates from other countries
6. Help businesses with some money if they hire people from other countries

7. Build more roads to improve transportation and access
8. Allow poor people living in the UK to attend school for free

14. Imagine that the government implements policies to help immigrants find a job. How do you think they will impact the following areas?

Order of columns is randomized. Columns will either go from very bad → very good, or go from very good → very bad.

Statement	Very bad	Mostly bad	Neither good nor bad	Mostly good	Very good
The country's economy (how much money the country makes)	○	○	○	○	○
Job availability (how many jobs there are)	○	○	○	○	○
National unity (how united the country feels)	○	○	○	○	○
Crime rates (how much crime there is)	○	○	○	○	○
Cultural diversity (how open the country is to new ideas and cultures)	○	○	○	○	○
Business performance (how well businesses do)	○	○	○	○	○
Public services availability (how easy it is to access and use hospital, schooling, and public transportation)	○	○	○	○	○
Government finances (how much money the government has, for instance, for pensions and unemployment benefits)	○	○	○	○	○

Treatment
Note: No content is shown to the control group. The respondents are randomly allocated to three groups and received different treatments:
- *Group 1 receives cross-country research-based evidence of the effect of migrant integration policies on public finances, natives labor market outcomes and immigrants' crime rate. Half of this group received the information in a qualitative manner (Treatment 1 – Qualitative Version), the second half received the same information but with the quantified effect (Treatment 1 – Quantitative Version).*

- *Group 2 treatment expands the information set given to the first group by explaining the mechanisms behind the effect presented. Similarly, half of this group received the information in a qualitative manner (Treatment 2 – Qualitative Version), the second half received the same information but with the quantified effect (Treatment 2 – Quantitative Version).*
- *Group 3 receives a treatment that consists of real-life examples of policy-related obstacles faced by immigrants when entering the labor market, their perseverance, and their success. Three stories are takes places in the three countries surveys and they are inspired by newspapers articles.*

Treatment 1 – Qualitative Version
In the UK, immigrants can wait **from a few months to several years** before receiving permission to work. Research studies* find that when immigrants start working **soon after they arrive,** the **economy gets bigger and stronger.** (*studies by Harvard University and the International Monetary Fund)


Research* shows that **immigrants who work legally pay more taxes** and contribute more money **than what the government spends** on their healthcare, education, and social security. (*studies by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the University College London)

In addition, studies* found that when **immigrants are properly placed and integrated into the workforce, wages** of local workers **increase,** and **more jobs** are created. (* studies by University of California-Davis, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales).

Finally, studies* have found that having more immigrants come in does not make crime rates go up. And **when immigrants are allowed to work legally,** their involvement in **crime goes down significantly.** (*studies by Bocconi University, McGill University, and Stanford University.)

In the UK, immigrants can wait **from a few months to several years** before receiving permission to work. Research studies* find that when immigrants start working **soon after they arrive,** the **economy gets bigger and stronger.** (*studies by Harvard University and the International Monetary Fund).

Research* shows that **immigrants who work legally pay more** taxes and contribute more money **than what the government spends** on their healthcare, education, and social security. In a study considering 25 countries, which includes the UK, overall immigrants pay 25% more in taxes than what they receive in benefits (*study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the University College London).

In addition, studies* found that when **immigrants are properly placed and integrated into the workforce, wages** of local workers **increase,** and **more jobs** are created. Estimates show that for each 10% more of immigrant workers finding a job, natives' wages increase by 5%. (* studies by University of California-Davis, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales).

Finally, in many countries, studies* have found that having more immigrants come in does not make crime rates go up. And **when immigrants are allowed to work legally,** their involvement in **crime goes down by 50%**. (*studies by Bocconi University, McGill University, and Stanford University)

Treatment 2 – Qualitative Version

In the UK, immigrants can wait from a **few months to several years** before receiving permission to work. Research studies* find that when immigrants **start working soon after they arrive,** the **economy gets bigger and stronger.** (*studies by Harvard University and the International Monetary Fund)

Research* shows that **immigrants who work legally pay more** taxes and contribute more money **than what the government spends** on their healthcare, education, and social security. (*studies by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the University College London)

Research findings* indicate that **when immigrants get jobs quickly, they pay taxes sooner and can buy more things.** This means the **government has more money** for hospitals, schools, buses, and paying pensions. **Local businesses sell more products** and services. (*studies by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the University College London)

In addition, studies* show that when immigrants are **properly placed and integrated into the workforce:**
1. They **fill job shortages** in places or occupations where locals are not available or sufficient.

2. **They open their own shops, more jobs**, are created, and **wages** of local workers **increase.**

3. **Native workers often shift to higher-skilled** jobs and **earn more** as time goes on.

(* studies by University of California-Davis, Centre d'Etudes, Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales)

Finally, in many countries, studies* have found that having more immigrants come in does not make crime rates go up. When immigrants are not allowed to work, sometimes they don't have other means to survive and they could become involved in illegal activities. However, researchers find that **when immigrants are allowed to work legally,** their involvement in **crime goes down significantly.** (*studies by Bocconi University, McGill University, and Stanford University)

In the UK, immigrants can wait **from a few months to several years** before receiving permission to work. Research studies* find that when immigrants **start working soon after they arrive**, the **economy gets bigger and stronger.** (*studies by the Harvard University and International Monetary Fund).

Research* shows that **immigrants who work legally pay more taxes** and contribute more money **than what the government spends** on their healthcare, education, and social security. In a study considering 25 countries, which includes the UK, overall immigrants pay 25% more in taxes than what they receive in benefits (*study by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the University College London).

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In addition, studies* found that when immigrants are **properly placed and integrated into the workforce:**
1. They **fill job shortages** in places or occupations where locals are not available or sufficient.

2. **They open their own shops, more jobs**, are created, and **wages** of local workers **increase.**

3. **Native workers often shift to higher-skilled** jobs and **earn more** as time goes on. Estimates show that for each 10% more of immigrant workers finding a job, natives' wages increase by 5%.

(* studies by University of California-Davis, Centre d'Etudes, Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales)

Finally, in many countries, studies* have found that having more immigrants come in does not make crime rates go up. When immigrants are not allowed to work, sometimes they don't have other means to survive and they could become involved in illegal activities. However, researchers find that **when immigrants are allowed to work legally,** their involvement in **crime goes down by 50%.** (*studies by Bocconi University, McGill University, and Stanford University)

Story n.1

Kabir, **a software engineer** from India, immigrated to Canada with dreams of a better future for himself and his family.

Upon arriving in Canada, Kabir **applied for more than 100 IT jobs over two years with no success,** due to lack of local experience. **He needed local experience to get a job, but he needed to get a job to get local experience.**

Kabir worked long hours in multiple jobs unrelated to his profession, **grappling with a profound sense of dissatisfaction,** until one day a friend informed him about a program to help professionals trained abroad.

After several months attending night courses to enhance his English and IT skills, **Kabir finally found a job as IT technical support in a bank.** He is delighted to reside in Canada with his family.

Story n.2

Marie, a **single mother** who arrived in the UK from Cameroon in August 2019, has been **waiting four years for her work permit to be processed.**

Marie has enrolled on a college course in data science and hopes to work in computing but **cannot be employed until her work permit is granted.**

Interviewed by a journalist, she said: **"I struggle with not knowing what the future holds and how to find a way to survive every day".** This psychological pressure and the precarious conditions put a toll on her, and she is now taking medicine against **depression** – as many other immigrants the similar uncertain situation.

Marie is **still waiting for her permit to be able to work.**

Story n.3

Bailo arrived in Italy from Libya in 2015. In his home country **he was a nurse, but his degree was not recognized in Italy.**

As he **did not speak Italian** and urgently needed a job, he started working picking tomatoes: 3 pounds to fill a chest with 300kg of tomatoes. For three years he worked from 6am to 9pm, living in an abandoned farmhouse with no running water or electricity, which he shared with 11 other people.

One day, he heard about an **organization that helps immigrants to have their foreign degree recognized.** He contacted the organization and after two years Bailo is finally doing what he knows best: he is a nurse.

He now has his own apartment and in his free time he trains the basketball team of the small city where he lives.

Access to Treatment Works Cited and Attention Check

15. We can provide you with the links to the mentioned studies at the end of the questionnaire (to avoid interrupting the survey flow). Would you like to receive those links?
   1. Yes, I would like to receive the links to the mentioned studies.
   2. No, I don't want to receive the links to the mentioned studies.

16. We can provide you with the links to the media reports at the end of the questionnaire (to avoid interrupting the survey flow). Would you like to receive those links?
   1. Yes, I would like to receive the links to the media reports mentioned.
   2. No, I don't want to receive the links to the media reports mentioned.

17. This is a simple colour test to check your attention, when asked for your favourite colour you must enter the word "puce" in the text box below. What is your favourite colour?
Short answer response

Post-Treatment Questions

Introduction to gather attention.

In the following section, we will ask for your opinion on some immigration policies to help immigrants find jobs. These can consist in offering language courses and professional training, improving the recognition of immigrants' qualifications, and set up job placement programs that connect immigrants directly with employers looking for their specific expertise.
Please answer the following questions truthfully.

Questions 17-19 appear in random order

17. In the UK, there are people who were born there (natives) and people who moved there from other countries (immigrants). If the government helps immigrants, do you think this necessarily comes at the expenses of the natives?

Answer choices appear in random order

   1. Yes, assisting immigrants necessarily comes at the expense of people born in the UK.
   2. No, assisting immigrants does not necessarily come at the expense of people born in the UK.

18. Imagine that the government implemented measures to integrate immigrants in the labour market. How do you think this would affect the following elements in the UK?

Order of columns is randomized. Columns will either go from strongly decrease → strongly increase, or go from strongly increase → strongly decrease.

Statement	Strongly decrease	Somewhat decrease	Neither increase nor decrease	Somewhat increase	Strongly increase
Jobs for people born in the UK	○	○	○	○	○
Money the government gets from taxes	○	○	○	○	○
Crime immigrants commit	○	○	○	○	○

19. Would you support or oppose the following policies to help immigrants find jobs in the UK? Please select one option for each of the policies proposed:

Order of columns is randomized. Columns will either go from strongly oppose → strongly support, or go from strongly support → strongly oppose

Statement	Strongly oppose	Somewhat oppose	Neither support nor oppose	Somewhat support	Strongly support
Giving immigrants work authorization as soon as they arrive	○	○	○	○	○
Making it quicker and easier to recognize immigrants' work experience and qualifications from other countries	○	○	○	○	○
Providing job training and job search assistance for immigrants	○	○	○	○	○
Supporting immigrants in creating new businesses (through access to financing, mentoring, and networking)	○	○	○	○	○

20. Overall, how much do you support government policies to help immigrants find jobs?
   1. Strongly oppose
   2. Somewhat oppose
   3. Neither oppose nor support
   4. Somewhat support
   5. Strongly support

Real-stake Questions

If we were to follow up this survey with the following two petitions, would you sign one of them?

21. A petition asking the government to increase policies that promote the integration of immigrants into the labour market.
   1. I want to sign this petition.
   2. I do not want to sign this petition.

22. A petition asking the government to reduce policies that promote the integration of immigrants into the labour market.
   1. I want to sign this petition.
   2. I do not want to sign this petition.

Reasoning behind support and opposition

In this section, respondents are asked to provide reasons for their support or opposition to the hypothetical migrant integration policy. For each concern that prevents them from supporting the policy, they are presented with hypothetical mitigation measures (complementary and compensatory actions) and asked if these measures would alter their stance on the integration policy, should the government implement them. If their position remains unchanged, the questionnaire allows them to express their final reasons for opposing the policy change.

23 a. Using your own words, please tell us more about your reasons for supporting the government assisting immigrants in finding jobs.
Short answer response

23 b. Using your own words, please tell us more about your reasons for opposing or not supporting the government assisting immigrants in finding jobs.
Short answer response

24. In a previous question, you answered that you support government policies that help immigrants finding jobs. Can you tell us why?

Answer choices appear in random order

   1. It would benefit me personally
   2. It would help the economy
   3. It would make the country safer
   4. Everyone deserves a chance
   5. Other reasons

25. In a previous question, you answered that you oppose or do not support government policies that help immigrants find jobs. Can you tell us why? Please tick all that apply:

Answer choices appear in random order

   1. I might lose my job or get paid less
   2. It might make it harder for me or my family to get access to hospitals, schools, or public transportation
   3. I'm not sure if it would help me, and I don't want to take the risk
   4. It could destroy a lot of jobs
   5. It might make our country unsafe
   6. Immigrants are too different from us
   7. Immigrants may be a burden on our country because we need to provide for their healthcare, public schooling, etc
   8. It is unfair to provide support to immigrants with so many natives struggling to find work
   9. Housing rents become very expensive

10. Other reasons

26. Previously, you answered that you do not support government policies that help immigrants find jobs because: "It might make our country unsafe "If the government promised to improve security by enhancing security measures within the country, would you be more supportive of policies to facilitate the integration of immigrants into the labour market?
   1. Yes
   2. No

27. Why not? Please tick all that apply.

Answer choices appear in random order

   1. You don't think the government has the capacity to control crime.
   2. You doubt the government's ability to implement a good reform.
   3. You believe immigrants are generally violent.
   4. You don't want foreign workers in your country.
   5. Other reasons

28. You selected other reasons in the previous question. Using your own words, please specify.
Short answer response

29.Previously, you answered that you do not support government policies that help immigrants find jobs because:

"You might lose your job or get paid less"
"It could destroy a lot of jobs"

If the government complements the policy by allocating immigrants to places and jobs that need workers or by giving them temporary work permits during times of the year that need more workers (for instance during harvest periods), would you be more supportive of policies to facilitate the integration of immigrants into the labour market?
   1. Yes
   2. No

30. Why not? Please tick all that apply.
   1. You don't trust the government to move immigrants to different areas.
   2. You doubt the government's ability to implement a good reform.
   3. You don't want foreign workers in your country.
   4. Other reasons

31. You selected other reasons in the previous question. Using your own words, please specify.
Short answer response

32. Previously, you answered that you do not support government policies that help immigrants find jobs because:

"You might lose your job or get paid less"
"It could destroy a lot of jobs"

If the government helps native workers who could face negative consequences from immigration (for instance, by temporarily lowering their taxes or social security payments, or by providing them training for other jobs) would you be more supportive of policies to facilitate the integration of immigrants into the labour market?

   1. Yes
   2. No

33. Why not? Please tick all that apply.

1. You don't think the government can make the changes work well
2. You don't want to switch to a different type of job
3. You don't believe training would help you get a better job
4. You don't want workers from other countries in our country
5. Other reasons

34. You selected other reasons in the previous question. Using your own words, please specify.
Short answer response

35. Previously, you answered that you do not support government policies that help immigrants find jobs because:

"You might lose your job or get paid less"
"It could destroy a lot of jobs"
"Immigrants may be a burden on our country"

If the government works together with nearby countries to oversee and relocate immigrants to countries where there aren't enough people with certain skills (like nurses), including the UK, would you be more supportive of policies to facilitate the integration of immigrants into the labour market?
1. Yes
2. No

36. Why not? Please tick all that apply.

Answer choices appear in random order

1. You don't think countries can agree on this.
2. You don't trust the government to make the plan work well.
3. You don't want workers from other countries in our country.
4. Other reasons

37. You selected other reasons in the previous question. Using your own words, please specify.
Short answer response

38. Previously, you answered that you do not support government policies that help immigrants find jobs because:

"Immigrants are too different from us"

If the government introduces initiatives to assist immigrants in learning about and respecting British culture to preserve our traditions and values, would you be more supportive of policies to facilitate the integration of immigrants into the labour market?

1. Yes
2. No

39. Why not? Please tick all that apply.

Answer choices appear in random order

1. You don't trust the government to implement and enforce the proposed measures.
2. You don't think these measures will make a difference.
3. Other reasons

40. You selected other reasons in the previous question. Using your own words, please specify.
Short answer response

41. Previously, you answered that you do not support government policies that help immigrants find jobs because:

"It might make it harder for you or your family to get access to hospitals, schools, or public transportation"

If the government improves schools, hospitals, and public transportation to prevent overcrowding and ensure everyone has access, would you be more supportive of policies to facilitate the integration of immigrants into the labour market?
   1. Yes
   2. No

42. Why not? Please tick all that apply.

Answer choices appear in random order

   1. You don't trust the government to build more schools and hospitals.
   2. You don't think these measures will make a difference.
   3. Other reasons

43. You selected other reasons in the previous question. Using your own words, please specify.
Short answer response

44. Previously, you answered that you do not support government policies that help immigrants find jobs because:

"It is unfair to provide support to immigrants with so many natives struggling to find work"

If the government ensures that policies to better integrate migrants in the labour market do not decrease government assistance for natives, would you be more supportive of policies to facilitate the integration of immigrants into the labour market?

   1. Yes
   2. No

45. Why not? Please tick all that apply.

Answer choices appear in random order

   1. You don't think the government is able to help natives
   2. You think that government resources are limited and the government can only help either natives or immigrants
   3. There are not enough jobs
   4. You don't want workers from other countries in our country
   5. Other reasons

46. You selected other reasons in the previous question. Using your own words, please specify.
Short answer response

47. Previously, you answered that you do not support government policies that help immigrants find jobs because:

"Housing rents become very expensive"

If the government complements the policy by financing the construction of new housing, or allocating immigrants to less-populated areas in the country, would you be more supportive of policies to facilitate the integration of immigrants into the labour market?

   1. Yes
   2. No

48. Why not? Please tick all that apply.

1. You don't think this is the solution.
2. You doubt the government's ability to implement a good reform.
3. You don't want foreign workers in your country.
4. Other reasons

49. You selected other reasons in the previous question. Using your own words, please specify.
Short answer response

Second Block of Demographics Questions

Now, we'd like to ask you a few questions about yourself.

Please read the next question very carefully.

50. The next question is about the following problem. In questionnaires like ours, sometimes there are participants who do not carefully read the questions and just quickly click through the survey. This means that there are a lot of random answers which compromise the results of research studies. To show that you read our questions carefully, please choose both "Extremely interested" and "Not interested at all" as your answer in the next question. Do not select any other option.

How interested are you in sports?
  1. Extremely interested
  2. Very interested
  3. A little bit interested
  4. Almost not interested
  5. Not interested at all

51. What is your current occupation?
  1. Employed (full-time)
  2. Employed (part-time)
  3. Self-employed
  4. Student
  5. Unemployed
  6. Retired
  7. Homemaker
  8. Other

52. Which category best describes your occupation?
  1. Farmer or agricultural labourer, rancher, fisher
  2. Manual labourer (e.g. factory worker, miner)
  3. Tradesperson (e.g. mechanic, welder, painter, railroad worker, plumber, tailor)
  4. Service worker (e.g. driver, waiter, cook, retail worker, cashier, barber, caregiver, housekeeper)
  5. Clerical worker (e.g. secretary, bookkeeper, receptionist, telephone operator)
  6. White-collar worker (e.g. manager, executive, businessperson, salesperson, accountant, banker)
  7. Professional (e.g. doctor, lawyer, engineer, IT/computer programmer)
  8. Medical (e.g. nurse, emergency medical technician, pharmacist)
  9. Protective service worker (e.g. police, fire)
  10. Educational service worker (e.g. teacher, professor)
  11. Public servant (e.g. bureaucrat, politician, military)
  12. Homemaker/stay-at-home parent
  13. Self-employed/small business owner (excluding farm owners)
  14. Other

53. What is your **highest** level of education? If you are currently in full-time education please put your highest qualification to date.

1. I did not complete any formal education
2. Early childhood education
3. Primary education
4. Lower secondary education (GCSEs or equivalent level)
5. Upper secondary education (A-Levels or baccalaureate)
6. Post-secondary, non-tertiary education (generally vocational/ professional qualification of 1-2 years, e.g. college, trade school)
7. Short-cycle tertiary education (vocational education and training, studying towards a non-academic degree, e.g. nursing/ teaching diploma)
8. Bachelors or equivalent level degree
9. Masters or equivalent level degree
10. Doctoral or equivalent level degree

54. Gross HOUSEHOLD income is the combined income of all those earners in a household from all sources, including wages, salaries, or rents and before tax deductions. What is your gross household income?
1. under £5,000 per year
2. £5,000 to £9,999 per year
3. £10,000 to £14,999 per year
4. £15,000 to £19,999 per year
5. £20,000 to £24,999 per year
6. £25,000 to £29,999 per year
7. £30,000 to £34,999 per year
8. £35,000 to £39,999 per year
9. £40,000 to £44,999 per year
10. £45,000 to £49,999 per year
11. £50,000 to £59,999 per year
12. £60,000 to £69,999 per year
13. £70,000 to £99,999 per year
14. £100,000 to £149,999 per year
15. £150,000 and over
16. Don't know
17. Prefer not to answer

55. Can you list one to three policies that the government can use to help immigrants to find a job?
Short answer response

56. Do you currently receive any social benefits or assistance from the government?
1. Yes
2. No
3. Unsure

57. Please select from the list the country / region where you were born. If you would prefer not to say, please select that option at the bottom.
Drop down list containing all countries

58. What is second citizenship, if any?
Drop down list containing all countries. First answer on the list is "I do not have a second citizenship".

59. Are your mother and father immigrants to this country or not?

Statement	Immigrant	Not an immigrant	Don't know
Mother	○	○	○
Father	○	○	○

60. Is at least one of your grandparents an immigrant to the UK?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don't know

61. Do you have friends living in the UK but born outside the UK?
   1. Yes
   2. No
   3. Don't know

62. Have you ever lived abroad?
   1. Yes
   2. No

63. Have you participated in any work or student exchange program abroad?
   1. Yes
   2. No

64. Do you currently participate in any peace movement, humanitarian or charitable organizations?
   1. Yes
   2. No

65. Does the organization or movement you are participating in aim to help or work with immigrants?
   1. Yes
   2. No

66. How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 means you are "completely satisfied".
Drop down list containing numbers 1-10

67. All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? 1 means you are "completely dissatisfied" and 10 means you are "completely satisfied".
Drop down list containing numbers 1-10

68. For each of the five organizations/groups listed below, please rate the level of confidence you have in them.

Statement	None at all	Not very much confidence	Some confidence	A great deal of confidence	I don't know
Your neighbours	○	○	○	○	○
Academic Researchers	○	○	○	○	○
Major companies	○	○	○	○	○
The press	○	○	○	○	○
The national government	○	○	○	○	○

For the following questions, imagine that you are given £100 to split between two people. You must give away the full amount and you cannot keep any for yourself. Please note that the two values need to add up to 100 or you will not be able to move on.

69. How would you split £100 between a randomly-selected person who lives outside the UK, and a randomly-selected person who lives in the UK?
Two short answer boxes for users to type in percentages; percentages entered must add to 100%

70. What language(s) do you speak at home?
   1. English
   2. Scots
   3. Irish
   4. Welsh
   5. Cornish
   6. Scottish Gaelic
   7. Angloromani
   8. Polish
   9. Panjabi
   10. Urdu
   11. Other [language_mult_t] {open}

71. Do you own or rent the home in which you live?
   1. Own – outright
   2. Own – with a mortgage
   3. Own (part-own) – through shared ownership scheme (i.e. pay part mortgage, part rent)
   4. Rent – from a private landlord
   5. Rent – from my local authority
   6. Rent – from a housing association
   7. Neither – I live with my parents, family or friends but pay some rent to them
   8. Neither – I live rent-free with my parents, family or friends

9. Other

72. At what age did you finish full-time education?
   1. 15 or under
   2. 16
   3. 17-18
   4. 19
   5. 20+
   6. Still at school/Full time student
   7. Can't remember
   97. Not applicable

73. What is your current marital or relationship status?
   1. Married
   2. Civil partnership
   3. Living with a partner, but neither married nor in a civil partnership
   4. Single
   5. Divorced
   6. Widowed
   7. Separated but still legally married or in a civil partnership
   8. In a relationship, but not living together
   97. Other
   999. Prefer not to say

74. Are you a parent or guardian? Please select all that apply
   1. Yes, of at least one child younger than 18 years old
   2. Yes, of at least one child 18 years old or older
   97. No, I am neither a parent or guardian
   98. Don't know/Prefer not to say

75. Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion, and if so, to which of these do you belong?
   1. No, I do not regard myself as belonging to any particular religion.
   2. Yes - Church of England/Anglican/Episcopal
   3. Yes - Roman Catholic
   4. Yes - Presbyterian/Church of Scotland
   5. Yes - Methodist
   6. Yes - Baptist
   17. Yes – Orthodox Christian
   18. Yes - Pentecostal (e.g. Assemblies of God, Elim Pentecostal Church, New Testament Church of God, Redeemed Christian Church of God)
   19. Yes - Evangelical – independent/non-denominational (e.g. FIEC, Pioneer, Vineyard, Newfrontiers)
   7. Yes - United Reformed Church
   8. Yes - Free Presbyterian
   9. Yes - Brethren
   10. Yes - Judaism
   11. Yes - Hinduism
   12. Yes - Islam
   13. Yes - Sikhism
   14. Yes - Buddhism
   15. Yes - Other
   16. Prefer not to say

76. How important is religion in your life?
   1. Very important
   2. Somewhat important
   3. Not too important
   4. Not at all important

77. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs ...
    1. Most of the time
    2. Some of the time
    3. Only now and then
    4. Hardly at all
    7. Don't know

78. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat or what?
    1. Conservative
    2. Labour
    3. Liberal Democrat
    4. Scottish National Party (SNP)
    5. Plaid Cymru
    6. UK Independence Party (UKIP)
    7. Green
    8. British National Party (BNP)
    9. Women's Equality Party
    98. Other
    97. No – None
    99. Don't know

79. In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right". How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?
Drop down menu with numbers 1-10. 1 = left and 10 = right.

80. Talking to people about the General Election in December 2019, we have found that a lot of people didn't manage to vote. How about you – did you manage to vote in the General Election?
    1. Yes, voted
    2. No, did not vote
    99. Don't know

81. Which party did you vote for at the General Election in December 2019?
    1. Conservative
    2. Labour
    3. Liberal Democrat
    4. Scottish National Party (SNP)
    5. Plaid Cymru
    6. Brexit Party
    7. Green
    98. Other
    99. Don't know

82. Talking to people about the General Election in December 2019, we have found that a lot of people didn't manage to vote. How about you – did you manage to vote in the General Election?
    1. Yes, voted
    2. No, did not vote
    99. Don't know

83. Which party did you vote for at the General Election in December 2019?
    1. DUP
    2. Sinn Fein
    3. SDLP
    4. UUP
    5. Alliance Party

98. Other
99. Don't know

84. In the Referendum in 2016 on whether Britain should remain in or leave the European Union, which way did you vote, or did you not vote?
   1. I voted to Remain
   2. I voted to Leave
   3. I did not vote
   4. Can't remember

85. How many years of formal education (structured education including primary school through university) have you completed?
Drop down list of numbers from 0 thru 22. Option for "not sure" also included.

Opinions on the Survey

Finally, we'd like to have your opinion about this survey.

86. Do you think this survey was politically biased?
   1. Very left-wing biased
   2. Somewhat left-wing biased
   3. Neither left-wing nor right-wing biased
   4. Somewhat right-wing biased
   5. Very right-wing biased

87. Did you find the information we provided you with trustworthy or untrustworthy?
   1. Very untrustworthy
   2. Somewhat untrustworthy
   3. Neither trustworthy nor untrustworthy
   4. Somewhat trustworthy
   5. Very trustworthy

88. Do you think this survey was too short, about the right length, or too long?
   1. Too short
   2. About the right length
   3. Too long

89. How easy was it to understand this survey?
   1. Very difficult
   2. Difficult
   3. Neither difficult nor easy
   4. Easy
   5. Very easy

90. Do you have any final suggestions or comments about this survey?
Short answer response

Thanks for Participation Message
Respondents received different versions of the message depending on whether or not they selected to see treatment works cited earlier in the survey.

Thank you for your participation in this survey.

Please find below links to the research evidence we mentioned in the survey:

Evidence on the fact that when immigrants start working soon after they arrive, the economy gets bigger and stronger:

1. **International Monetary Fund**: https://www.elibrary.imf.org/display/book/9781513539744/ch04.xml
2. **Harvard University**: https://hbr.org/2017/04/why-mass-migration-is-good-for-long-term-economic-growth

Evidence on the fact that when immigrants are properly placed and integrated into the workforce, wages of local workers increase, and more jobs are created:

3. **University of California, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales**: https://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeeecrev/v_3a96_3ay_3a2017_3ai_3ac_3ap_3a62-82.htm

Evidence on the fact that immigrants who work legally pay more taxes and contribute more money than what the government spends on their healthcare, education, and social security:

4. **Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development**: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/international-migration-outlook-2021_3e2ffd79-en
5. **University College London**: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1475-5890.2010.00106.x

Evidence on the fact that more immigrants do not lead to higher crime rates and that when immigrants get permission to work, their involvement in crime goes down significantly:

6. **Bocconi University**: https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.38.1.181
7. **McGill University**: https://www.mcgill.ca/newsroom/channels/news/does-immigration-really-increase-crime-347099
8. **Stanford University**: https://news.stanford.edu/2022/06/01/overturning-immigration-myths/

Thank you for your participation in this survey.
Please find below links to the research evidence we mentioned in the survey:

Articles on Immigrant Experiences and Challenges:

1. **My Canadian immigrant story: The foreign credentials struggle**: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40651176
2. **'I struggle not knowing what the future holds' - Asylum backlog reaches record high**: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-66603767
3. **Are your tinned tomatoes picked by slave labour?** | Italy | The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/20/tomatoes-italy-mafia-migrant-labour-modern-slavery

Thank you for your participation in this survey.

PUBLICATIONS

Shifting Perceptions: Unpacking Public Support for Immigrant Workers Integration in the Labor Market
Working Paper No. WP/2024/217