Bank Risk Within and Across Equilibria

July 2, 2014

Preview Citation

Format: Chicago

Itai Agur. Bank Risk Within and Across Equilibria, (USA: International Monetary Fund, 2014) accessed November 23, 2024

Disclaimer: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate

Summary

The global financial crisis highlighted that the financial system can be most vulnerable when it seems most stable. This paper models non-linear dynamics in banking. Small shocks can lead from an equilibrium with few bank defaults straight to a full freeze. The mechanism is based on amplification between adverse selection on banks' funding market and moral hazard in bank monitoring. Our results imply trade-offs between regulators' microprudential desire to shield individual weak banks and the macroprudential consequences of doing so. Moreover, limiting bank reliance on wholesale funding always reduces systemic risk, but limiting the correlation between bank portfolios does not.

Subject: Bank credit, Bank deposits, Banking, Systemic risk

Keywords: Adverse selection, Financial crisis, Interest rate, WP

Publication Details

Pages:

37
Volume:

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DOI:

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Issue:

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Series:

Working Paper No. 2014/116
Stock No:

WPIEA2014116
ISBN:

9781498306515
ISSN:

1018-5941

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